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Introduction 
 
The banking industry has always sought to keep up with technological advances and financial 
innovations. However, in the last decade it is facing a new disruption wave, caused by the 
introduction of new technologies and significant shifts in customers’ needs.  
Moreover, the banking industry had to cope with the strengthening of the financial regulation 
as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The financial crisis highlighted banking sector’s 
weaknesses related to excessive leverage and inadequate capital. The greater rigidity of the 
financial regulation increased compliance costs and obligations for financial institutions. 
Therefore, banks were induced to focus more on compliance instead of innovation. 
The combination of these factors favoured the emergence of new players in the financial 
ecosystem: the FinTech companies (henceforth “FinTechs”).  
FinTech includes a wide range of new technologies and digital innovations applied to the 
financial sector and financial activities. FinTechs provide financial services and solutions using 
new technologies such as distributed ledger technology (DLT), machine learning, artificial 
intelligence (AI), robo-advisory and application programming interfaces (APIs). 
After the 2008 financial crisis, the global investment in FinTechs increased significantly. In 
2014 investments tripled in one year to reach the amount of $12.2 billion (Accenture, 2015). 
The global investment activity in FinTechs attained a second peak in 2015 ($25billion), 
followed by a reduction in 2016 ($14.2 billion) and in 2017 ($12.4 billion) (KPMG, 2018). A 
third peak is expected in 2018 since the global investment in H2’18 is already equal to $31.7 
billion.  
FinTechs rely on new technologies to offer innovative financial services that better meet new 
customers’ needs and habits. Moreover, they are based on innovative business models that 
enable them to increase access to financial services. The features and the rapid growth of 
FinTechs destabilized the financial ecosystem and especially the banking industry. Traditional 
player (the incumbents) are facing a fierce competition from FinTechs. They are feeling 
threatened by FinTechs and they need to change their strategy to survive in the financial sector. 
The new solutions offered by FinTechs aimed at providing the customers with ease of use, high 
transaction speed and transparency, and a wider choice of financial services and providers. 
Financial incumbents are facing new competitors not only digitizing their processes but also 
investing in FinTechs or collaborating with them. In this way, they gain access to the latest 
technologies and to new customers without radically changing their infrastructures.  
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The present work will focus on the relationship between the banking industry and FinTech to 
analyse the impact of FinTechs on the performance of the traditional banking sector. The 
dissertation is divided in three chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on the emergence and the 
development of the FinTech phenomenon. Firstly, we provide a general definition of FinTech 
and we examine its expansion in the financial industry after the 2008 financial crisis. Secondly, 
we analyse drivers, benefits and challenges of FinTech for the financial industry. Finally, we 
conclude with the difficulties in regulating FinTech and with the rise of RegTech. 
In Chapter 2 we analyse the main implications of FinTech and FinTechs for the banking 
industry in terms of performance. In the first section we focus on the FinTech innovations that 
mostly threaten the traditional banks while in the second section we describe the main financial 
ratios used in the academic literature to measure banks’ performance in terms of profitability 
and efficiency. 
In the first section of Chapter 3 we examine the potential relationships between banks and 
FinTechs in order to understand the strategy of the incumbents to face the fierce competition 
from new entrants. In the second part we present a case study to analyse the impact of FinTechs 
acquisitions on the post-acquisition performance (in terms of profitability and efficiency) of the 
acquiring company. To investigate this issue, we analyse the acquisitions of FinTechs 
performed by BBVA, a Spanish banking Group, in 2014 and 2016. 
We hypothesize that FinTech acquisitions have no impact on the post-acquisition performance 
of BBVA. To test this assumption, we compare pre-acquisition and post-acquisition financial 
ratios (ROE, ROA, CIR) of the Spanish Group using a paired t-test. Finally we comment and 
discuss the results obtained to assess whether FinTechs acquisition have a significant impact 
on the post-acquisition performance of the acquiring firm. 
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1.The FinTech phenomenon 
 
To understand the main features and dynamics of the Fintech phenomenon, it is first necessary 
to define it. The term FinTech is a neologism that comes from the words “financial” and 
“technology” and it indicates the connection of new technologies with traditional activities of 
the financial industry (Gomber et al., 2017). 
We can find a great variety of definitions and interpretations in the academic literature (Varga, 
2017), but in this paper we will provide a summary.  
Following the perspective of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), FinTech is “technologically 
enabled financial innovation that could result in new business models, applications, processes, 
products or services with an associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and 
the provisions of financial services”.   
FinTech includes digital innovations and technology-enabled business models in the financial 
industry and such innovations can transform the traditional industry structure, improve strategic 
intermediation, increase access to financial services, but also generate privacy, regulatory and 
law-enforcement changes (Philippon, 2017). 
FinTech includes a wide range of digital innovations such as online marketplace lending (also 
known as online peer-to-peer lending), equity crowdfunding, robo-advice, distributed ledger 
technology (DLT), cryptocurrencies and machine learning (Schindler, 2017). 
Ozaee and Sohrabi (2017) described FinTech as a system of software and digital platforms to 
deliver financial services to final consumers. In this sense FinTech is an industry that refers to 
companies that try to make financial solutions more flexible and efficient through a greater 
support of new technologies. Fintech companies are generally technological start-ups which 
provide clients with an array of services and strive to consolidate their position in the financial 
market by competing with traditional banks and financial players (Darolles, 2016). 
In Gomber et al. (2017) FinTech contains innovators and disruptors in the financial sector that 
offer more flexibility, efficiency and opportunities than the traditional financial intermediaries. 
FinTech is considered as “sustaining FinTech” when it refers to existing financial firms that use 
innovation to strengthen their business, or as “disruptive FinTech” where start-ups and new 
companies adopt IT to compete with traditional financial firms by supplying new products and 
services. (Lee, 2015). 
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Despite the different perspectives, authors agree to define Fintech as the marriage of financial 
services and information technology (Arner et al., 2016), whose aim is to promise more 
flexibility, efficiency and security to customers than incumbent financial institutions. 
 
In the first part of our work we will follow the definition of FinTech provided by the Financial 
Stability Board since our principal aim is to study the dynamics and the effects of the 
phenomenon and not of FinTech firms.  
Summing up, FinTech activities can be organized into five categories of financial services: (i) 
payments, clearing and settlement; (ii) deposits, lending and capital raising; (iii) insurance; (iv) 
investment management; and (v) market support (FSB, 2017). For example, the category of 
payment involves new and innovative payment solutions such as mobile payment systems. P2P 
transfers and cryptocurrencies; deposits and lending activities include crowdfunding, 
crowdlending, and microcredit solutions. (Haddad and Hornuf, 2018).  
 
1.1 The development of FinTech in the financial industry 
In a broader sense, FinTech is the application of technology to finance, but this is not a novelty 
for the financial industry (Arner et al., 2016). Technology and innovation have always had a 
key role in the evolution of the financial sector. Indeed, the last 60 years represent an important 
step forward in terms of innovation: in the 1950s the credit cards revolutionized the payment 
system, in the late 1960s the introduction of the Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) replaced 
branches and tellers, the 1970s promoted the first electronic stock trading on exchange trading 
floors, during the 1980s financial institutions implemented new ITs, while the 1990s brought 
Internet and e-commerce business models (Ozaee and Sohrabi, 2017).  
Even though financial players have always looked for and adopted new solutions to best satisfy 
their clients, the waves of financial and technological innovation of the last decades caused 
important changes in the financial landscape, concerning not only products and services but 
also regulatory issues (EBA, 2017).  
To understand how and why FinTech today influences financial players and markets, it’s 
fundamental to summarize the evolution of this phenomenon.  
 
1.1.1 The process of FinTech evolution 
Arner et al. (2016) tried to understand how FinTech established itself in the financial market 
and what factors drove its development. The authors distinguished three phases of FinTech 
evolution, specifying that the term Fintech does not refer only to specific sectors or business 
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models, but it entails all services and products offered by incumbent financial institutions. The 
first stage (1866-1987) is FinTech 1.0 and it allowed the transition from an analogue industry 
to a digital one; new technologies developed during the 19th century facilitated the transmission 
of financial information, transactions and payments across borders. The technological 
innovation of this period favoured the establishment of a modern infrastructure, which 
increased the global interconnection of financial institutions (Varga, 2017).  
1987 marked the beginning of a new era characterized by the globalization and digitalisation of 
financial processes based on electronic transactions between financial players and their 
customers around the world.  Financial institutions began to adopt computerized trading 
systems, banks developed IT infrastructures for internal operations and relationships with their 
retail clients and new regulatory standards were drawn up to face new risks in the financial 
industry. With the emergence of Internet most of banks fully digitized internal processes and 
relations with outsiders and retail customers. Even though the innovation occurred during this 
era was initially regarded as disruptive, it represented the “birth of modern banking” (Varga, 
2017) based on IT infrastructures, branch-focused business models and advanced technological 
systems.  
With the internet evolution in the 1990s, technological advances transformed the nature of the 
financial services industry and led to the development of electronic finance (e-finance) which 
refers to many financial services such as banking and stock trading performed through 
electronic means (Lee and Shin, 2017). The mobile finance asserted itself during the 2000s 
thanks to important innovations in the smartphone user base and this facilitated the emergence 
of new services such as mobile payment and mobile banking that are an extension of e-finance.  
The innovations introduced in the two last decades favoured the success of FinTech especially 
after the worldwide crisis of 2008 by combining e-finance, internet technologies, artificial 
intelligence and big data analytics.  
Until 2008 FinTech included traditional regulated financial players that provided financial 
services and products using new technologies; after the global financial crisis new start-ups and 
established technology companies emerged in the financial industry, which began to offer 
financial solutions and services directly to businesses and final customers.  
Since the 2008 global financial crisis represented the turning point for the growth of FinTech 
3.0, we decide to briefly discuss the consequences of the crisis, that accelerated the development 
and the success of FinTech in the financial industry. 
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1.1.2 The role of the 2008 financial crisis in the development of FinTech 
The financial crisis in 2008 is only one of the factors that caused significant changes in the 
banking and financial sectors (Nicoletti, 2017). As underlined by Darolles (2016) the financial 
crisis had a strong influence both on the regulation of the traditional financial institutions and 
on the trust of clients in their banks.  
Since the crisis of 2008 revealed systemic risk in the activities of traditional players, post-crisis 
reforms reinforced the regulatory framework mainly for banks.  
The consequences of the crisis were amplified by the failings of the banking sector such as 
excessive leverage, low-quality and inadequate capital, and insufficient liquidity buffers 
(BCBS, 2010a). Therefore, the banking system was not able to absorb the resulting losses, and 
the financial crisis was transferred to the rest of the financial industry and the real economy, 
causing a significant reduction in credit and liquidity availability.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) decided to intervene after the financial 
crisis to increase the banks’ ability to absorb shocks and reduce risk of spillover from the 
financial sector to the real economy. The post-crisis reforms have been referred to as “Basel 
III” whose main aim concerns a stronger capital and liquidity regulation mixed with 
improvements in banks’ supervision, risk management, greater transparency and disclosure. 
For BCBS it was fundamental to restore the health of the banking system, as it is the centre of 
the credit intermediation process between savers and investors and it provides a wide range of 
financial services to customers, SMEs, large companies and governments. (BCBS, 2010b). 
The effects of the financial crisis were so strong, since the global banking system faced the 
crisis with an insufficient level of high-quality capital. For this reason, the new regulation 
redefines the bank capital, focusing on common equity, which is considered the highest quality 
component of a bank’s capital. The regulatory capital comprises Tier 1 Capital, made up by 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) and Additional Tier 1, and Tier 2 Capital. The new rules 
introduced new restrictions for these categories: a minimum CET1 ratio of 4.5% of risk-
weighted assets at all times with a conservation buffer of 2.5% to all forms of capital;  Tier 1 
Capital must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times and the Total Capital (Tier 1+ 
Tier 2) must be at least at 8.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times (BCBS 2010b, Cosimano 
and Hakura 2011). 
Since the BCBS considered the inadequate liquidity in the financial system as one of the main 
culprits of the 2008 crisis, it decided to implement the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), a short-
term measure to verify whether banks have enough liquidity to meet expected future outflows 
within a 30-day period (McNamara et al., 2014). In particular, the aim of the LCR is to 
guarantee, that banks own sufficient high-quality liquidity assets (HQLA) to survive a 30-day 
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stress scenario and the timeline established by the BCBS imposed on banks to achieve a LCR 
of 60% by January 1,2015 and a LCR of 100% by January 1, 2019. 
During the financial crisis banks were forced to reduce their excessive balance sheet leverage 
and this caused additional downward pressure on asset prices and contraction in credit 
availability. Hence, the Basel Committee decided to introduce a simple and non-risk based 
leverage ratio to constrain the increase of leverage in the banking sector – avoiding deleveraging 
processes that can damage the financial system and the economy- and reinforce the risk based 
requirements (BCBS,2010b) 
Consequences of Basel III on the banking sector are the subject of many debates in the literature 
(Cosimano and Hakura, 2011).  
Some authors (Admati et al., 2011) argued, that higher capital requirements can generate 
significant benefits by reducing leverage and the risk of bankruptcies in the banking sector. 
Increasing bank equity allows to limit systemic risk events, because banks are required to fund 
themselves with more equity than they did before the financial crisis. In addition, the authors 
demonstrate that the social costs of rising capital requirements are very small for large financial 
institutions. 
On the other side, Arner et al. (2016) asserted, that the greater rigidity of the new regulation 
has increased the compliance obligations of banks and modified their incentives and business 
structures.  
Basel III has also reduced the capacity of banks to provide low-value loans with damages 
especially to SMEs or private individuals, who usually choose new players or innovations to 
fund themselves.  
Spinassou (2013) showed, that the capital requirements, imposed by Basel III, reduce the credit 
supply without guaranteeing an improvement in the financial stability and that the higher 
leverage ratio, introduced since 2010, induces banks to prefer risky projects to safe ones. 
Cosimano and Hakura (2011) focused their analysis on the impact of new capital requirements 
of Basel III on the behaviour of banks in developed countries from 2001-2009. The results 
suggested, that the new standards determine higher loan rates and slower loan growth, even if 
banks’ reaction vary from one economy to another one, considering the cross-country variations 
in banks’ net cost of raising equity and the elasticity of loan demand with respect to changes in 
loan rates.  
Even though the main goal of Basel III was to defeat the weaknesses of the banking and the 
financial sectors, banks reduced their activities, since they were obliged to keep greater reserves 
and they are still considered by the public opinion as the real responsible for the financial crisis 
(Darolles, 2016). 
14 
 
Financial crisis has also changed the public perception of the banking system (Arner et al., 
2015). The authors underlined the effect of the financial crisis on the labour market focusing 
on two sets of individuals. Firstly, many financial professionals either lost their jobs or were 
less well remunerated after the financial crisis and consequently most of this under-utilized 
educated workforce has been admitted to the new industry of FinTech 3.0. On the other hand, 
the financial crisis has indirectly damaged the newer generations, that are facing many 
difficulties in the labour market, even though their education and skills are in line with FinTech 
innovations.   
Especially younger generation have lost their faith in banks since the financial players were not 
able to manage their risks during the financial crisis and they avoided the bankruptcy only 
thanks to significant injection of public money (Darolles, 2016).  
Finally, several studies pointed out that the loss of confidence in financial institutions mainly 
on the part of European and American consumers is accompanied by a substantial increase in 
confidence in financial services provided by technological institutions (Fujitsu, 2016). This 
attitude bolsters the acceptance of FinTech innovations especially among the young at the 
expense of traditional providers of financial services. 
 
1.2 The drivers of FinTech: demand and supply factors 
After analysing the historical evolution of FinTech, we focus on the main drivers and 
determinants of this phenomenon to understand, why it is exploding right now in the financial 
sector. 
Schindler (2017) adopted a demand and supply framework of financial innovation, that is then 
applied to the definition of FinTech.  
 
1.2.1 The supply side factors 
Starting on the supply side, supply drivers represent what leads someone to provide new 
products or services to the financial market; in this category we can find continuous 
technological progress, regulatory environment, revolutionary innovations and the 
macroeconomic landscape (Kerenyi and Molnar, 2017).  
As analysed above, technology has always played a key role in the evolution of the financial 
sector: ATMs, Internet, e-finance, online banking and mobile payments have been important 
technology advances, representing a great breakthrough in the financial innovation. 
Technological innovations could have material impacts on the structure of the financial system 
in terms of concentration, contestability and composition (FSB, 2017). A decrease in 
concentrations is generally associated with greater competition, lower market power of players 
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and lower prices; technology reduces concentration, when it allows new or non-traditional 
service providers to compete with incumbents and to offer goods or services, that overcome the 
existing regulation. 
Considering contestability, technology may reduce costs for new entrants and facilitate their 
access to technology. However, the consequence is the reduction of the incumbents’ pricing 
power. 
Finally, technology may favour the unbundling of financial services, leading to a change in the 
composition of service providers and to a great amount of activities, that are not subject to the 
regulatory framework. 
Financial innovation is often driven also by regulation which comprises changes in regulatory 
and supervisory requirements.  
As underlined above, the causes and consequences of the 2008 financial crisis induced 
regulators to improve the previous set of rules with a great impact on the business incentives of 
incumbents and new players (FBS, 2017). By increasing the rigidity of the requirements for the 
banking sector, banks reduced low-value loans and were forced to move away from short-term 
funding (Schindler, 2017). Now banks must comply with stricter standards, whose aim is to 
protect the financial intermediary system and the consumers from another financial meltdown 
(Kerenyi and Molnar, 2017). Since the new regulation damaged the ability of banks to meet the 
needs of all types of customers, this favoured the emergence of new financial players, that took 
the place of incumbents in providing financial products and services to clients and businesses.  
In many cases an innovation creates in turn another innovation, which trigger an “innovation 
spiral”, leading to a natural sequence of innovations (Schindler, 2017). In this sense, innovation 
can be interpreted as a supply factor because it allows the emergence of another innovation.  
Innovation can be revolutionary, when it transforms the market conditions and features in a 
radical way (Kerenyi and Molnar, 2017). Considering the FinTech sector, the distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) is an example of disruptive innovation, that deeply modifies payment, 
clearing and settlement (PCS) processes (Mills et al., 2016). DTLs allow their users to collect 
and access information relating to a given set of assets and their holders in a shared database, 
which can be used to settle the transfers of securities and cash without the need of a central 
ledger or authority (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016). This technology executes a large number of 
real-time transactions rapidly, reducing the operating costs of payments and especially cross-
border money transfers (Kerenyi and Molnar, 2017). 
Financial innovation is usually driven by changes in the financial and macroeconomic 
landscape (Schindler, 2017). The author stated, that the collapse of the American housing 
market on the eve of the crisis caused a significant rise in the quantity of real estate, owned by 
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banks and financial institutions; this situation encouraged many financial players to securitize 
the rental income from the real estate they owned. This led to an important innovation in the 
financial sector, since it would be more difficult for financial institutions to create such a 
product without the collapse of the housing market which left them with lots of real estate.  
Considering the macroeconomic landscape, the increase in the number of FinTech players has 
been favoured also by the low interest rate environment caused by the international financial 
crisis (Kerenyi and Molnar, 2017). After the financial meltdown, the result was the 
implementation of an active monetary police with a cut in interest rates and the introduction of 
quantitative easing measures. Although the stricter and risk-averse regulation introduced after 
the 2008 crisis reduced the instability of the financial system, in several countries, especially in 
Europe, it has become more difficult to fund and support innovations and initiatives; therefore, 
the innovations that characterize FinTech often come from new market players (start-ups, 
technology companies) which are not subject to that regulation (Zilgalvis, 2014). 
 
1.2.2 The demand side factors 
Considering the demand side, financial players can create and offer lots of products and 
services, but there is a necessary condition for their success: there should be a sufficient market 
demand for these products.  
Consumer habits and preferences are the first demand driver for financial innovation. 
Consumers’ and companies’ habits have changed with the evolution of technology and the 
penetration of Internet not only in their everyday life, but also in how banks conduct their 
activities (Kerenyi and Molnar, 2016). Customers are now looking for more convenient, 
tailored and faster financial solutions than in the past, and they expect an immediate access to 
financial services, that are in line with the rest of their online activities (Wilkins, 2016).  
The customer base of FinTech services is composed mainly by younger generations, that have 
developed different habits from their elders. Younger people require personalised solutions, 
that are in strong contrast with the traditional approach of banks and other financial institutions, 
which are prone to offer products for the mass market (Darolles, 2016). In addition, younger 
generations are more comfortable in using latest technologies and for this reason they represent 
the targeted customers of FinTech companies. Despite the success of FinTech solutions among 
youngers, financial incumbents are aware, that they should satisfy their demand with more 
innovative and interactive products and services (Schindler,2017).  
Besides demographics, Schindler recognized, that regulation acts both as supply factor and as 
demand driver, since it can contribute to demand for new products and services. To prove this 
hypothesis, the author focused on the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which requires banks to 
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hold an adequate stock of high-quality liquidity assets (HQLA) to meet their liquidity needs 
within a 30-day period (BCBS, 2013). So, if a bank has issued a bond or another instrument 
that is coming due within 30 days, the bank must hold HQLAs to cover the impending outflow. 
From the author’s perspective, this creates demand for products, that do not lead to the 
implementation of the LCR; one of these products is the callable commercial paper.  
A commercial paper typically includes short-term promissory notes issued by corporations or 
other issuers to fund future operations. In case of commercial papers, banks provide back-up 
liquidity facilities to the issuers, which can drown upon them to repay a maturing issue of 
commercial paper, if the issuers are not able to sell a new issue of commercial paper to do so (a 
process called “rolling over”). If the issuer draws upon the back-up facility during the 30-day 
period of LCR, the new regulation introduced by Basel III imposes on the facility provider to 
maintain corresponding HQLA. The consequence of LCR is an increase in the cost to banks of 
providing backup liquidity facilities for commercial papers that mature in 30 days or less. To 
avoid such draws occurring within the 30-day LCR window, banks developed commercial 
papers, that include a call provision allowing issuers to redeem the commercial paper before 
the start of the 30-day period. Therefore, if a commercial paper is redeemed before it reaches 
its maturity (30 days), then the issuer of the commercial paper cannot draw upon the liquidity 
facilities within 30 days and consequently banks do not need to maintain any HQLA in support 
of the facility (McNamara et al., 2014). 
In this case, the regulation (Basel III), that introduced the LCR, created demand for a new 
product (on the part of issuers of commercial paper) and induced someone (banks) to supply 
the new product.  
 
1.2.3 The emergence of fintech companies 
In the first part of this paragraph, we analysed the main drivers of the FinTech phenomenon, 
considering demand and supply side, even if many studies also focus on factors, which favoured 
the emergence of fintech companies.  
Haddad and Hornuf (2018) examined the main economic and technological determinants, that 
explain the formation and the success of fintech start-ups, which are categorized into nine 
different types: those that operate in financing, payment, asset management, insurance 
(insurtechs), loyalty programs, risk management, exchanges, regulatory technology (regtech) 
and other business activities. The study focuses on fintech start-ups formation in 55 countries 
between 2006 and 2014 and it is based on four main hypotheses. First, the authors supposed, 
that well-developed economies and capital markets facilitate the formation of fintech start-ups. 
Indeed, these start-ups need enough financing to start and carry on their business models and 
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so, if the traditional capital markets are well-developed, entrepreneurs have better access to the 
necessary resources to fund their businesses. In addition, in more advanced economies it’s more 
likely, that individuals require innovative services and new financial tools especially within 
large financial markets, which offer greater possibilities of changes through innovation and 
digitalization. 
A second driver is the availability of the latest technology in the economy. As already analysed 
for the FinTech phenomenon, technological advances are a fundamental prerequisite to 
introduce new solutions and to disrupt the traditional financial sector. Fintech companies need 
technological innovations to satisfy new customers’ needs, by implementing faster payment 
systems and offering easier operations, to improve the sharing of information and to reduce the 
costs of banking transactions. To encourage the supply of fintech solutions, latest technologies 
need to be accompanied by a supporting infrastructure, that should be already available in the 
economy of the country. 
The third factor of Fintechs formation relates to the nature of the financial sector. The 2008 
financial crisis played a key role in the sudden upsurge of fintech start-ups for several reasons.  
The lack of trust in banks after the crisis benefitted FinTechs, which interrupted the vicious 
circle of distrust and reduced financial soundness.  
The financial meltdown also increased the cost of debt for many SMEs and in many cases, 
banks stopped lending money to businesses, while many FinTech start-ups in the area of 
crowdlending and crowdfunding were able to fill this gap. Therefore, the demand for FinTech 
services should be higher in countries which were more strongly hit by the financial crisis and 
where the banking sector is less sound.  
Lastly, the authors considered the role of credit, labour market and regulation in FinTechs 
formation. The authors observed, that economies should adopt a supportive regulatory regime 
to attract entrepreneurs and to promote the emergence of start-ups. Furthermore, individuals are 
more prone to establish a new business, if there are no significant restrictions on how the credit 
is supplied to the private sector and no controls on interest rates, that interfere with the credit 
market.  
The authors also tried to understand how the features of the labour market can affect FinTech 
start-ups. First, an economy should allow market forces to determine wages and conditions, so 
that start-ups can find talented individual and to easily hire and fire employees. Indeed, large 
bureaucratic costs and complicated administrative requirements might prevent any new 
business activity.  
Following the report by Ernst&Young (2016), the Fintech ecosystem is based on many 
attributes, among which there are talent and entrepreneurial availability. A country with a large 
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workforce of skilled talent has a more positive influence on the emergence of FinTech 
companies.  
Analysing all these aspects, the authors concluded that FinTech start-ups are more frequent in 
countries and regions with a more supportive regulation and a larger labour market. 
Despite the great success of FinTech start-ups, they are not the only ones, that operate in the 
FinTech sector. (Kerenyi and Molnar, 2017). Indeed, in the recent years many large non-bank 
companies have started offering financial services, that once were a prerogative of traditional 
financial institutions. Technology companies have become the most successful FinTech 
companies, since they can overcome entry barriers to the banking market thanks to their 
features: they have a large customer base, the adequate IT infrastructure and a solid reputation. 
Although most of technology companies provide their existing customers with online and 
mobile payment systems (for example: Google Wallet, Apple Pay and Amazon Payment), some 
of them takes part also in lending activities.  
 
1.3 Opportunities and challenges of FinTech 
FinTech is a very complex movement, that includes both technological innovations applied to 
financial services and fintech companies that provide innovative financial services. Considering 
the double nature of FinTech, we will examine benefits and challenges of both the general 
phenomenon and companies operating in the FinTech sector, since both have the potential to 
reshape and at the same to disrupt the existing financial sector.  
 
1.3.1 Benefits of FinTech in the financial industry 
Financial innovations arise as solutions to market inefficiencies or imperfections and they 
provide benefits by improving at least one inefficiency (Henderson and Pearson, 2009). 
Starting from the upsides, FinTech seeks to globalize simple financial services by improving 
financial inclusion especially in developing and emerging countries, where the financial 
services are not yet widespread. To increase financial inclusion, FinTech offers simple financial 
products and services thanks to new instruments and technologies.  
With respect to traditional incumbents, which generally adopt a mass market approach, FinTech 
may entail benefits for customers through improved quality and user experience, more tailored 
products, easier access to financial services and cheaper financial solutions (EBA, 2017). By 
utilizing big data, FinTech analyses individual customers preferences, and so it offers 
personalised tools and solutions (Nakaso, 2016). Indeed, FinTech companies pay more 
attention to customers’ specific needs and attitudes, because the final decision is up to clients, 
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that are looking for interactive and flexible services according to their wants (Ozaee and 
Sohrabi, 2017). 
FinTech can generate efficiencies also for credit and other financial institutions: cost reduction, 
faster provision of services, increases in customers number thank to greater financial inclusion 
and lower regulatory compliance costs (EBA,2017). FinTech companies decrease banking costs 
due to bricks and mortar branches, complex procedures and severe industry regulations, since 
FinTech disrupters are not constrained by rigid regulations, legacy IT systems or branch 
networks like traditional financial players are. (Ozaee and Sohrabi, 2017).  
Moreover, FinTech companies can meet mainly SMEs loan applications, that in many cases 
banks are obliged to refuse because of stricter standards imposed after the 2008 financial crisis. 
This is possible as most of FinTech lending companies use alternative data and ways of 
assessing credit risk by increasing credit availability for consumers (smaller, younger, less 
profitable and minority-owned businesses), that previously were underserved (Jagtiani and 
Lemieux, 2017). Some FinTech lenders have developed their own algorithms and online 
lending platforms, which include non-conventional information (sales data, shipping data, cash 
flow analysis from business checking accounts) to evaluate the credit risk of the borrowers. 
FinTech lenders have access to non-traditional information, which are not used or not available 
to traditional bank lenders, such as FICO scores (which estimates the credit worthiness 
considering: payment history, current level of indebtedness, types of credit used, length of credit 
history and new credit accounts) and DTI (debt-to-income) ratios.   
All these innovations favour a more stable credit landscape and allow FinTech firms to avoid 
two basic risks of banking activities: mismatched maturities and leverage (Ozaee and Sohrabi, 
2017). Indeed, banks act as financial intermediaries: they take deposits, provide loans to 
borrowers and liquidity to depositors (fractional-reserve banking), even if these functions may 
cause bank run, which sometimes triggered crisis in the past (Nakaso, 2016). FinTech 
companies do not accept deposits: in case of online lending platforms, they simply match 
borrowers and savers directly. 
In a broader sense, FinTech can benefit the financial industry through the provision of new 
services and business models, the rise in market transparency and improvements in the 
efficiency of information exchange (EBA, 2017).  
In conclusion, FinTech revolution has significantly modified the financial industry and the 
activities of traditional financial players: (i) it  has transformed business models, financial 
intermediation and customer access to new solutions; (ii) it provides new financial products and 
services with a higher level of personalization thanks to the application of big data analytics; 
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(iii) FinTech companies substituted some of traditional banks’ activities and deliver their 
services through new and more attractive non-banking channels (Gomber et al., 2018). 
 
1.3.2 Risks and challenges of FinTech in the financial industry  
Despite the benefits of FinTech innovations, they also bring new issues regarding payment and 
settlement (Nakaso, 2016).  Firstly, FinTech may introduce significant changes in the structure 
of settlement and other financial services. As already mentioned, DLT is one of the most 
revolutionary innovation introduced by FinTech, and its emergence can significantly affect the 
traditional settlement structure based on centralized bookkeepers, since DLT promotes 
“decentralization-oriented” technologies. Increasing automation could guarantee greater 
efficiency and certainty, but at the same time it could increase financial volatility, which may 
be only short-term or create procyclical dynamics (Wilkins, 2016). 
The digital transformation of finance has increased the potential for cyber-attacks, as most of 
innovations are founded on digitisation, interconnected IT systems and the sharing of data 
across a wider set of parties (EBA,2017). FinTech technologies and networks are becoming 
accessible especially through open gateways such as internet and smartphones, and this 
increases the need to strengthen appropriate measures against cyber threats (Nakaso, 2016). 
Therefore, if cybersecurity systems are hacked, there will rise operational, legal and 
reputational issues and financial losses for institutions and this may weaken long-term trust in 
new solutions, leading to lower adoption rates (EBA,2017).  At worst, there might be a wave 
of coordinated attacks causing a liquidity squeeze in the financial market and threatening the 
solvency of financial players (Darolles, 2016). The FinTech process has made the financial 
industry more vulnerable to attacks, and cybersecurity is the clearest example of how FinTech 
needs a regulation (Arner et al., 2016). 
FinTech initiatives have generated important challenges regarding regulation and traditional 
financial players’ behaviour relative to technology adoption (Nicoletti, 2017). Although we are 
going to discuss the relationship between FinTech and regulation in next pages, we have already 
underlined, that many FinTech activities and companies emerge and operate outside the 
traditional regulatory framework. On the one side this favours more flexibility, greater speed 
and lower compliance costs for FinTechs; on the other side it makes more difficult for regulators 
to monitor these activities and there is a lower level of coordination among financial services, 
FinTech companies and regulatory officials (Nicoletti, 2017).  
The evolution of FinTech has created some challenges for traditional financial players. Relative 
to the digital transformation promoted by FinTech evolution, incumbents have only few 
possible strategic solutions to compete with newcomers (Darolles, 2016). FinTech companies 
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have a competitive advantage thanks to the adoption of innovations, while financial players try 
to be fast adopters (Merler, 2017), by expanding the technical skills of their IT teams and 
encouraging their staff to adopt new working methods and procedures. This might also imply 
the purchase of financial products and services from FinTech firms or directly the acquisition 
of FinTech start-ups, even if this last solution is rare. Traditional financial players seem to be 
hostile to merge a new entity with their existing infrastructures, although the acquisition could 
bring important advantages to traditional incumbents. 
Another solution is the collaboration with FinTech companies to develop new services and to 
move traditional client relationships towards a more interactive and tailored system (Darolles, 
2016). The collaboration may benefit both FinTech companies and traditional financial players; 
indeed, to sell their services, FinTechs need partners who know how to operate in the financial 
industry, and incumbents in turn can provide their products to third parties in unbranded forms. 
This solution is adopted by traditional financial players to create ties with FinTechs and exploit 
their distribution channels and customer base. In this new model incumbents operate as product 
design platforms, selling unbranded solutions to FinTechs and so becoming more capable of 
satisfying changes in users’ needs. The only risk with this model is that FinTech companies, 
which have a direct relationship with clients, might bypass the platform supplying the financial 
products. 
Despite risks and challenges, the lack of FinTech innovation would lead to a risk of technology 
complacency and obsolescence relative to other countries (Nicoletti, 2017). Without 
technological advances, financial institutions might lose their competitive advantage and 
therefore, their financial environment might become non-competitive in the global financial 
market.  
 
Some authors try to investigate the effects of FinTech also in relation to the real economy, in 
terms of economic growth, GDP per capita and industry volatility.  
Beck et al. (2014) assessed the relationship between financial innovation and economic growth 
and volatility. Analysing a set of 32 countries over the last decade, the authors found that: (i) a 
higher financial innovation leads to stronger growth opportunities for a country and to a higher 
GDP per capita growth; (ii) a higher financial innovation is associated with higher growth of 
industries, that rely more on external financing; (iii) a higher level of financial innovation 
causes higher growth volatility among industries, which rely more on external funding. 
In addition, the authors underlined, that the relationship between financial innovation and real 
economy also depends on the features of the market environment, the financial structure and 
the regulatory framework. For example, the positive effect might be stronger in market-based 
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financial systems than in banks-based financial systems. Indeed, the first ones are more prone 
to stimulate financial innovation, completing financial markets and exacerbating negative 
effects; the second ones are more focus on the innovation in the retail sector, improving 
customers’ experience through new products and services. Concerning the regulatory 
framework, we have already discussed the consequences, that the tightening of bank regulation 
after 2008 had on the evolution of financial innovation. On the one hand, more restrictive 
requirements increased banks’ difficulties and limited the possibilities to innovate; on the other 
hand, they facilitated the success of FinTech solutions, giving banks more incentives to 
innovate in their turn.  
The results of this study confirmed, that there are both “bright” and “dark” sides to financial 
innovation, since it encourages a stronger economic development, but at the same time it turns 
out into higher volatility in industries, which benefit more from financial innovation. 
Since finance has a strong connection with economy, the positive effects of FinTech on the 
financial industry also spread to the real economy sector (Nakaso, 2016). FinTech innovations 
stimulate and improve financial inclusion, which in its turn has a positive impact on economy; 
if people have access to new financial services, they have the opportunity to expand innovative 
businesses such as e-commerce and e-learning, which in developing countries are hindered by 
the limited access to payment services. Therefore, FinTech contributes to economic 
development with new financial services and opportunities, even if in developed countries it is 
more difficult to quantitatively assess the impacts of FinTech on the economy because of the 
high level of technological innovation. 
 
1.3.3 FinTech and financial stability 
FinTech might have significant implications in the financial industry in terms of financial 
stability.  
As underlined by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), FinTech can either support or undermine 
financial stability; indeed, innovations could guarantee a more efficient provision of financial 
services and a reduction in financial frictions, but at the same time they could intensify existing 
difficulties or introduce new ones. 
The main benefits to financial stability first include decentralisation and diversification, which 
can curb the consequences of financial meltdowns in some circumstances. Specially in 
developing countries, financial market diversity is a necessary condition for financial stability; 
indeed, the failure of a single financial institution has a weaker influence on the market, since 
there would be other providers of the same financial services. Efficiency in operations also 
provides support to financial stability, since it favours stable business models of financial 
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institutions and creates advantages in terms of overall efficiency in the financial system and the 
real economy. 
A third factor, that contribute to a greater financial stability, is transparency, as it reduces 
information asymmetries and it allows to assess and price risks more accurately. Securitisations 
are an example of modern financial innovation; the opacity of securitisations was considered 
by many scholars as one of the main issues, which led to the 2008 financial crisis by generating 
severe agency problems in loan underwriting, screening and monitoring. To reduce the opacity, 
both the EU and the US adopted new regulations, that impose more asset-level transparency for 
many types of asset-backed securities. Ertan et al. (2016) demonstrated that new standards, 
especially in Europe, have encouraged securitized loans of better quality in terms of lower 
default probability, lower delinquent amount and lower losses upon default.  
Moreover, transparency stimulates the creation of financial instruments with exposure to 
specific risks, completing markets and increasing market participants’ ability to manage risk. 
The last benefit of FinTech to financial stability is represented by the access to and the 
convenience of financial services. We have already discussed, that for example FinTech credit 
increases the availability of credit mainly for households and SMEs, who are generally 
underserved by traditional financial players. Besides the access to financial services, FinTech 
innovation also improves financial inclusion by providing new technologies and instruments. 
Therefore, access to and convenience of financial services are two fundamental conditions for 
supporting sustainable economic growth and providing a diversification of exposure to 
investment risk. 
The FSB also analyses the factors that could undermine the financial stability, separating micro-
financial risks and macro-financial risks. Micro-financial risks are those, that make individual 
firms, financial market institutions or sectors particularly vulnerable to shocks and they include 
both financial sources and operational sources. Examples of financial sources are maturity 
mismatch, liquidity mismatch, and leverage, which expose the counterpart to losses. 
Operational sources refer to: (i) governance or process control issues, which can lead to a 
disruption in the provision of financial services or critical infrastructures; (ii) cyber risks, which 
can damage the protection of data and the integrity of systems, causing financial losses for 
institutions; (iii)  legal and regulatory risks, which can negatively affect the confidence in the 
system leading to reputational issues. 
Macro-financial risks refer to weaknesses, which could amplify shocks to the financial system 
and consequently impair the financial stability. Potential risks include: (i) contagion, which is 
the possibility, that a distress suffered by a single financial institution or sector could influence 
other institutions or sectors in the financial market, causing a decrease in confidence in those 
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institutions or sectors; (ii) procyclicality, which refers to the natural tendency of financial 
variable to fluctuate around a trend during the economic cycle (Landau, 2009) and which can 
threaten financial stability,  when market participants’ actions exacerbate the degree and impact 
of fluctuations in economic growth and market prices over longer terms; (iii) excess volatility, 
arising when the financial system overreacts to news causing solvency or liquidity problems, 
which can impair the functioning of asset and credit markets, especially in case of homogeneity 
of business models; (iv) systemic importance: entities that are considered too important and 
“too big to fail” may lead to moral hazard, because they generally operate outside the current 
regulatory perimeter and they never take on bank-like risks (maturity transformation and 
leverage). In addition, they may compromise the competition with other service providers, since 
they are considered systemically important for the financial industry (Wilkins, 2016). 
 
1.3.4 Implications of FinTech credit on financial stability 
In this paper, we define as FinTech credit all credit activities facilitated by electronic online 
platforms, which match borrowers and savers directly and process a large amounts of 
customer information (BIS, 2017).  
Since FinTech credit activity plays an important role and has generated significant interest in 
financial markets, the FSB also analyses the effects of FinTech credit on financial stability.  
The FinTech credit activity has grown fast over the last years, even if it follows different 
paths across different jurisdictions (Claessens et al., 2018). China is the largest market 
(considering data referred to 2016) followed by United States and United Kingdom at a 
distance. After the rapid growth in 2013-2016, the evolution of FinTech credit suffered a 
slowdown in many major jurisdictions; even though FinTech credit markets have experienced 
a rapid expansion in recent years, their size remains small relative to credit provided by 
traditional financial intermediaries (BIS,2017).  The actual small size of FinTech credit limits 
its direct influence on financial stability; however, if this sector were supposed to increase, it 
would bring both benefits and risks for the financial stability (Merler, 2017). 
The most important advantage of FinTech credit is the improvement in financial inclusion, 
which allows investors to obtain alternative products and borrowers with limited access to 
bank-intermediated credit to receive the necessary funding. FinTech may also reduce 
transaction costs, including search costs and costs incurred during loan origination and 
maintenance processes, thanks to the digitalisation of lending process and the introduction of 
new lending technologies. The decrease in transaction costs could lead to lower lending costs 
and better risk-adjusted returns for investors; however, it is fundamental to assess whether 
FinTech lenders are able to transform lower lending costs in advantages for their borrowers in 
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terms of lower prices (Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2017). Indeed, Philippon (2017) found, that the 
unit cost of financial intermediation has declined only marginally after the 2008 crisis despite 
the significant evolution of FinTech. 
The creation of innovative lending platforms may also encourage the diversification of credit 
sources in the economy, as they provide alternative solutions, that are more suitable for 
smaller firms and final consumers. The greater diversity in credit provision can benefit the 
traditional banking sector in specific circumstances, where FinTech credit platforms act as 
“spare tyre” for lending in the economy. In fact, FinTech offers new options and solutions, 
through which credit can flow to other parts of the economy, if traditional lending is not 
available. In this sense, FinTech credit increases the efficiency of incumbents (Merler, 2017) 
and in some jurisdictions, governments use FinTech credit platforms to stimulate credit 
markets after a banking crisis (BIS, 2017). 
 
At the same time, many advantages of FinTech are linked to potential risks. FinTech increases 
accessibility to credit for many categories of customers, but with the threat of a deterioration 
in lending standards. Sahay et al. (2015) identified a bell-shaped relationship between credit 
inclusion and banks’ stability. In countries with weaker bank supervision the negative effect 
of greater credit access on bank buffers is more pronounced, while in countries with high 
levels of supervisory quality, credit inclusion is positively associated with higher bank 
buffers. So, the authors concluded that the impact of a broadening credit access on bank 
stability depends on the quality of the supervision, and they underlined the need for strong 
supervision to improve financial inclusion through credit. 
FinTech credit may also lead to more procyclical credit provision like a reduction in lending 
conditions during an economic upswing and a pullback in credit in case of financial distress. 
A significant pullback of FinTech credit generates a systemic risk concerning the availability 
of substitute forms of credit, either through other online lending platforms or traditional 
financial intermediaries. Considering the small size of FinTech credit in most of countries, it 
is difficult for borrowers to find alternative FinTech credit platforms quickly and for this 
reason barriers to existing platforms offering different types of lending are not high. 
Traditional financial intermediaries rarely supply credit to certain borrowers, such as very 
small or self-employed businesses. Therefore, it is unlikely that FinTech lending will be 
promptly replaced from solutions outside the FinTech credit industry. 
Moreover, FinTech lending companies are more prone to help investors with herd behaviour 
and more volatile credit risk appetite, even if FinTech lending platforms may be more 
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exposed than banks to some micro-financial risks due to their greater use of untested and 
digital processes. 
Financial stability could also be undermined by the securitisation of FinTech credit 
obligations into large pools. This process allows borrowers to obtain funding from different 
classes of institutional investors and FinTech investments to be actively traded; however, an 
increased use of securitisation may cause some financial stability risks. Firstly, this process 
rises the connection between FinTech platforms, traditional banks and capital markets. 
Therefore, the continuous expansion of FinTech credit market can generate new channels, 
through which risks in the FinTech credit sector are transmitted to the wider financial system 
and vice versa.  
Secondly, securitisations of FinTech credit obligations can bring to greater opacity in the 
overall market due to the bundling and tranching of loans obligations. Indeed, many FinTech 
credit activities have emerged outside the regulatory perimeter with consequent difficulties for 
authorities in monitoring and managing.  
 
1.4 Regulation of FinTech 
One of the main issues concerning FinTech evolution is connected to the regulation of this 
recent phenomenon. The 2008 global financial crisis induced regulators to strengthen the 
existing rules and to introduce new requirements especially in the financial and banking sectors, 
favouring the evolution of FinTech activities and companies.  
FinTech generally emerges and operates outside the regulatory perimeter and the non-
traditional products and services offered by FinTech companies may not observe the traditional 
financial regulation (Arner et al., 2016). For this reason, it becomes more difficult for regulators 
to monitor and evaluate FinTech activities. 
 
1.4.1 Difficulties in regulating FinTech 
Regulators’ objectives about financial industry are: financial stability, prudential regulation, 
conduct and fairness, competition and market development (Arner et al., 2016). Before 
elaborating a suitable regulation, supervisors need to analyse the benefits and the applicability 
of a technology. The introduction of a new technology, as FinTech, does not always imply that 
it will be widely adopted and so that it will be subject to new rules. Since FinTech emerging 
players are growing fast and they are threatening traditional incumbents, regulators need to 
intervene by adjusting their methods and rules to best support FinTech. 
Considering the significant changes in financial and banking sectors over the last decades, there 
are two main risks that regulators need to avoid (Darolles, 2016). First, regulators should 
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prevent overprotecting incumbents creating high entry barriers for newcomers. Indeed, an 
excessive regulation can stifle financial innovation and competition. Regulators also need to 
favour new FinTech players with a less rigid regulation than incumbents. With respect to 
traditional financial players, newcomers are generally not constrained by severe requirements 
and rules introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis, even if this may cause the lack of 
information protection and so issues of security. Regulators’ decisions have both a direct and 
an indirect influence on the competition between incumbents and new players in the financial 
market; the main goal of the regulatory framework is to guarantee parity for all financial agents 
and at the same time to promote an innovative, competitive and secure financial market. 
Regulation should guarantee equal treatment and competition among all players for the 
soundness of the financial industry. Moreover rule-setters also need to focus on the incentives 
offered to market agents and how these can influence the behaviour and the decisions of players. 
Darolles (2016) suggested creating a harmonised set of rules and avoiding different regulations 
for different categories of players, since this would break up the financial market and interfere 
with the emergence of new players and with the evolution of financial innovation. 
FinTech innovation brings both benefits and challenges for the financial market, but its interests 
are not always in line with the long-term goals of regulators (Philippon, 2017). FinTech 
companies generally enter the market where their activities can be profitable, although there are 
many sectors where the incumbents’ presence is deep-seated and so entry is difficult. In these 
cases, the aim of the regulation is to actively encourage entry and to guarantee level playing 
field among traditional and new financial players. Nevertheless, in real markets the argument 
of level playing field, elaborated by Darolles (2016) as a fundamental goal for regulators, does 
not apply due to main biases of the financial sector. The principle of level playing field is not 
coherent when incumbents are “too-big-to fail” and it applies only when newcomers carry out 
the same activities of traditional players but with more efficiency or at lower costs 
(Philippon,2017).  
For regulators it is a challenge to find a right regulation framework for new FinTech activities, 
as the financial industry includes both incumbents and newcomers and it should be dynamic 
fitting to continuous changes in the size and activity of businesses (Arner et al., 2016). For 
FinTech start-ups regulation may be too expensive (compliance costs, licence applications) and 
incompatible with their lean business models. For emerging new players, it would be better to 
apply a principle-based regulatory regime which includes more flexible compliance obligations 
with respect to a rule-based regime. Both regimes have advantages and disadvantages for 
FinTech companies. A principle-based regime guarantees more flexibility especially for early-
stage firms, but at the same time it creates uncertainty in terms of compliance and limitations 
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in terms of scalability for a more mature business. A rule-based regime clearly defines rules 
and processes giving right incentives to the supervised entity, but it leads to higher compliance 
costs and greater complexity. A suitable option for FinTech start-ups might be a combination 
of both regimes since the principle-based system allows companies to be more flexible and 
dynamic, while the rule-based one makes FinTechs more attractive to investors and creates a 
barrier to entry for subsequent new competitors. 
Regulators face a difficult task in finding a balance between incumbents’ interests and the need 
to control the emergence of new financial players (Darolles, 2016). On the one hand, authorities 
tend to impose stricter and tighter rules on existing players, since they know their businesses 
and goals. On the other hand, they tend to be more lenient with market entrants, which conduct 
new activities and provide new services, whose risks are still not fully understood. A right 
regulation should permit incumbents to survive, favour financial innovation and promote a 
healthy competition and to reach these goals some authors suggests principles and guidelines 
for rules-setters. Darolles (2016) argued that regulation should encourage healthy competition 
among players, whether they implement new technologies or offer traditional solutions, and 
remove all obstacles to growth for new entrants. Moreover, the regulation framework should 
not make any difference among players, but cover all them simultaneously, regardless of their 
characteristics or activities (principle of level playing field). Lastly, the main aim of regulators 
should be the protection of users of the financial system, which can continuously cause new 
and unexpected risks.  
As FinTech involves risks and challenges, regulators need to focus on the downsides of this 
phenomenon, defending users of financial services and the stability of the financial system. As 
discussed above, one of the main risks of FinTech is the increase in cyber-attacks due to the 
greater use of online services, online platforms and technologies.  For regulators the main 
obstacle is the lack of historical cases and data about cyber-risks and so they do not know how 
to evaluate and regulate these risks. The only solution for authorities is to identify plausible 
attack scenarios and test their consequences on FinTech businesses; regulators need to become 
expertise of this field to fulfil their role. Another risk, that regulators need to face, is the 
outsourcing of some tasks within financial transactions. If traditional players decide to 
collaborate with FinTech players, they generally offload some traditional activities or tasks onto 
external service providers, especially in the case of jobs with a high technological content. In 
this way, traditional financial players reduce cost pressures and FinTech companies are more 
efficient, since they are better able to use new technologies. The issue is that the transaction is 
split between traditional regulated financial players and FinTech companies that are not 
necessarily subject to specific requirements and this causes a breach in the supervision system. 
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Lastly, authorities need to focus and supervise the use of Big Data Analytics that might bring 
to negative consequence for users of financial services (Nicoletti, 2017). Regulators should 
guarantee that data collection do not damage the privacy of users and that personal information 
about customers is not used as a discriminatory tool. 
 
1.4.2 The rise of RegTech 
Since the FinTech process has introduced significant changes in the financial industry, 
authorities were induced to combine the traditional objectives of financial stability and 
consumer protection with the goals of growth and financial innovation (Arner et al., 2017). The 
outcome is a process of regulatory innovation, which includes technology (“RegTech”) and 
changes to existing regulatory frameworks such as the introduction of regulatory sandboxes. 
RegTech is the contraction of “regulation technology” and it indicates a system of new 
technological applications (e.g. artificial intelligence, machine learning and distributed ledgers) 
used to comply with a stricter and more complex regulation of the financial industry (Allen and 
Berg, 2018). RegTech offers a continuous monitoring capacity providing close to real-time 
insights and it seeks to identify problems in advance rather than take measures after the fact 
(Arner et al., 2016).  
The emergence of RegTech is attributable to: (i) the complex, fragmented and ever-evolving 
post-crisis financial regulatory regime which cause higher compliance and supervision costs for 
the regulators and the supervised entities; (ii) technological advances, which can improve data 
management and analysis such as new cryptographic technology, blockchain, robotics and 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) (IIF, 2016); (iii) the need of financial institutions 
to reduce compliance costs and (iv) the goal of supervisors to strengthen competition and 
guarantee financial stability and market integrity.  
RegTech covers three complementary groups of participants. Firstly, financial players who 
apply new technologies to meet new requirements and standards, arising from post-crisis 
regulations. Secondly, regulators who face the rapid emergence of FinTech companies and 
technologies and so need to use RegTech to conform with new challenges and tasks. As 
mentioned above, regulators have a double goal: they need to protect users of financial services 
and the financial stability without hindering financial development and innovation. Lastly, 
policy-makers and regulators who need to create the necessary infrastructure to meet changes 
in the financial system and to support their new regulation. This implies an increasing use of 
and reliance on RegTech which allows financial institutions to comply with rules and 
authorities to understand innovative products and complex transactions.  
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Like FinTech, RegTech offers both opportunities and risks. The application of new technologies 
to regulatory frameworks allows to reduce compliance costs, to shorten bureaucratic procedures 
and to provide more flexibility and dynamism to FinTech companies. However, RegTech often 
requires significant investments due to the use of new instruments and procedures. Moreover, 
although RegTech contributes to increasing the efficiency of regulatory compliance, this does 
not necessarily imply a reduction in the overall burden of regulation, since compliance is only 
a small part of the red tape burden (Allen and Berg, 2018). Lastly, there is still uncertainty in 
the market about the usefulness and success of these new technologies, that can be used to 
reduce the complexity of rules, but whose future evolution and development might be impeded 
by regulations. 
Another novelty in the regulation of FinTech is represented by regulatory sandboxes, that 
enable innovative financial players to check the feasibility of their new financial products, 
services and business models within a “test environment” with the exemption from regulatory 
obligations (Fáykiss et al., 2018). Sandboxes allow start-ups and incumbents to conduct the test 
under real market circumstances for a specific time and involving a limited number of real 
customers.  
Companies that are admitted to regulatory sandboxes need to follow a specific procedure to 
satisfy certain conditions for getting into the test. Firstly, the innovative product or service 
presented by the entity should have an element of novelty for the consumers and clients; 
secondly, the entity should meet the requirements of market entry. If the test has a positive 
result, then the innovation can enter the market.  
Regulatory sandboxes are set up by authorities to promote competition and efficiencies through 
innovation and to improve the relationship between supervisors and financial services providers 
(Jenik and Lauer, 2017). Arner et al. (2016) underlined that the main market objectives for 
sandboxes are to reduce time-to-market at a potentially lower costs (FinTech start-ups can 
operate without complete licensing obligations), provide better access to finance and foster 
more innovative products. 
Until now (at the end of 2017), the framework of regulatory sandbox is not widely applied yet. 
The first country introducing this innovation was United Kingdom in 2015, followed by about 
ten countries in Asia and Middle East. In Europe, only the Netherlands and Switzerland are 
adopting specific and dedicated regulatory sandboxes, even if at the European Union level more 
initiatives are evolving and focusing on FinTech challenges.  
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2. Implications of FinTech for banks and banking systems 
 
In the first chapter of this work, we described the main activities, benefits and risks of FinTech 
phenomenon and FinTech companies. Our analysis shows that traditional banks are particularly 
threatened by FinTech which may cause the disaggregation of banks’ value chain (Boot, 2017). 
FinTech start-ups mainly focus on retail banking, lending, and payment systems (McKinsey & 
Co., 2016) and they have developed new technologies and instruments, such as peer-to-peer 
lending platforms, online crowdfunding markets, robo-advisors and machine learning tools, 
which allow to understand and satisfy customers’ needs for tailored, cheaper and easier to use 
financial solutions. P2P lending platforms provide credits without bank intermediation 
matching borrowers and lenders directly, when customers and firms invest in small businesses 
(SMEs or younger businesses). These platforms reduce intermediation costs and evaluate the 
credit risk of borrowers applying algorithms and big data analytics and using non-conventional 
information about customers (Vives, 2017). 
Payments are an important area of FinTech characterized by significant development, even if 
banks still maintain their leader position (Boot, 2017). Traditional payment systems may be 
disrupted by digital currencies such as Bitcoin (Vives, 2017). Digital currencies are generated 
using blockchain technology where transactions can be verified with blocks of records without 
any intermediary or banks’ intermediary function. These systems facilitate the introduction of 
many potential cost-saving innovations and they allow to generate new currencies without the 
backing of government or a trustworthy go-between. Blockchain technology is considered as 
one of the biggest disruptions in the financial industry since it increases transparency in 
transactions and provides mechanisms which protect customers’ privacy (Bussmann, 2017). 
Lastly, traditional functions of banks may also be hampered by robo-advisors and machine 
learning tools which provide investment advice and avoid some of the usual conflicts of interest 
between customers and human advisors. Robo-advice is a FinTech innovation which is 
challenging the traditional financial advisory services (Kaya, 2017). Robo-advice offers online 
investment guidance and portfolio management services based on algorithms and models to 
find optimal investment strategies for clients. Robo-advisors are fully automated online 
platforms that provide customers with digital finance advice and portfolio allocation.  
Furthermore, FinTech companies represent the major competitors of traditional banks because 
they do not have to comply with severe regulations as opposed to traditional incumbents who 
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must deal with stricter requirements (Bussmann, 2017). So, FinTechs operate with more agility 
and they face lower compliance costs, and this enables them to offer cheaper and faster financial 
products. With respect to newcomers, traditional banks are still trapped in a lot of red tape, even 
if they strive to invest heavily in technology and use it more than in the past to compete with 
new entrants and survive in the new financial industry. 
Technological innovations have a double effect on traditional banks: on the one hand 
incumbents adopt new technologies to cut costs, improve the quality of their products and be 
more attentive to customers’ needs; on the other hand, innovation reduces traditional barriers 
to entry in the credit and financial services markets, increasing the competition with FinTech 
companies which offer technology-intensive and low-cost solutions (Panetta, 2018). 
Although FinTech start-ups are growing fast and they undermine traditional financial 
institutions, they also represent an opportunity for incumbents and mainly for banks to 
revolutionize their business models and to offer more specific value propositions.  
Indeed, FinTechs and banks can benefit from a collaboration or partnership because both have 
valuable assets and capabilities to share (Juengerkes, 2016). FinTechs are tech-driven, apply 
innovative technologies, are not bound to legacy systems, and provide personalised financial 
solutions. Banks have a larger customer base, offer regulated products and services, and add 
their industry expertise and know how.  
There are several motives that induce banks and FinTechs to create an alliance (Klus et al., 
2018). Collaborating with an incumbent financial player allows FinTech companies to enlarge 
their customer base, increase their financial knowledge, improve trust and credibility and obtain 
access to a banking license which in some cases would be too expensive for a start-up alone. 
On the other hand, bank might outsource some activities to their partners, gain a rapid 
innovation thanks to FinTechs’ technological advances and secure a competitive advantage 
since FinTech firms develop innovative ways to provide financial services.  
Although the 2008 financial crisis undermined consumers’ confidence in the banking industry 
and FinTech companies threat the functions and activities of the banking system, banks are still 
considered a safe place for people investment and money (Boot, 2017). 
In conclusion, traditional banks adopt new technologies and innovations to compete with 
fintech newcomers and to preserve financial stability despite the limits imposed by the severe 
regulation. FinTech start-ups may be a threat to the banking system, since (i) they offer tailored 
financial services that meet customers preferences and needs; (ii) they provide more flexible 
and dynamic financial solutions thanks to the lighter regulation; (iii) they operate in the same 
market of traditional banks, also reaching customers and businesses underserved by incumbents 
and (iv) they have taken over functions and activities previously assigned only to banks. 
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2.1 New FinTech instruments for the banking sector 
Although FinTech exacerbates competition in the financial market, it can also provide 
instruments and methods to banks to manage high costs and regulatory and market pressures 
which came up after the 2008 financial crisis (Bussmann, 2017). 
We first seek to understand which FinTech innovations are more adopted and known by users, 
which are not only final customers, but also banks and other financial institution. For this 
purpose, we refer to a study which analyses the FinTech adoption in Australia, Canada, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, the U.K., and the U.S. in 2015 (Gulamhuseinwala et al., 2015). The FinTech 
adoption is measured through the EY FinTech Adoption Index, considering four main 
categories: savings and investments, money transfers and payments, borrowing, and insurance. 
Money transfer and payments (online foreign exchange, non-banks to transfer money) have the 
highest adoption rate (17.6%) followed by savings and investments (peer-to-peer platforms, 
equity or rewards crowdfunding, online investment advice), insurance and borrowing (fintech 
lending, online marketplace). 
Focusing on the relationship between FinTech and the traditional banks, the most disruptive 
innovations for the banking sector have emerged in payments, lending and crowd-based 
financing, as reported by McKinsey & Co. (2016). Since the aim of this work is to analyse the 
implication of FinTech for the banking system, we decide to examine the main innovations in 
these sectors, and we analyse whether they bring concrete benefits to banks or weaken their 
long-hand position.  
 
2.1.1 Payment systems 
Traditional payment systems involve many agents, instruments, institutions, and processes 
which generally imply high costs and great complexity. Changes, technological advances and 
innovations have always characterized payment systems aiming at improving the nature of 
processes in the customers’ interest (Gomber et al., 2018).  
The current payments landscape is threatened by the entry of nonbank digital players, the 
modernization of payments infrastructures, the reduction in cross-border payments 
inefficiencies and the digitization of retail banking transactions (McKinsey & Co., 2015). Non-
bank digital players are entering the payment system increasing competition for banks, taking 
away important customer relationships and reducing margins on domestic transactions while 
favouring electronic payments instead of cash and checks. Banks also need to conform to new 
products, digital channels and technologies introduced by nonbank players to compete 
effectively with them and meet evolving customer needs. The entry of non-bank players affects 
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not only the domestic payments system but also cross-border payments. Until now, banks have 
done little to solve the inefficiencies of cross-border payments which remain expensive for 
customers. FinTech instruments and players try to solve the limits of cross-border payments 
such as lack of transparency and tracking and slow processing time moving from C2C to B2B 
cross-border payments systems. Another solution to reduce costs and speed up cross-border 
payments is the use of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, even if the price 
volatility of DLT-based instruments and the lack of trust in them could weaken their positive 
influence on the payment system (Gomber et al., 2018).  
Finally, the digital revolution in consumer payments and retail banking is expanding with 
important changes in transaction banking; as customers and individuals are getting used to 
faster and cheaper payments on the retail side, they will look for similar services in transaction 
banking for their companies.  
FinTech innovations in the payments sector especially concern cashless solutions (mobile 
payments, integrated billing and streamlined payments) and non-traditional payment schemes 
(cryptocurrencies, peer-to-peer transfers and mobile money) (WEF, 2015). Cashless solutions 
guarantee simplicity, interoperability and value-added services. Firstly, they facilitate 
customers’ transactions allowing them to make payments in a single tap. Secondly, most of 
innovative solutions are not limited to a single payment method, but they allow customers to 
manage and use a variety of credit cards, debit cards and bank accounts for payment. Lastly, 
many innovative solutions also offer value-added services and functionalities in addition to 
payments enabling financial institutions to create closer customers relationships and deliver 
additional value.  
As the traditional payment systems are built on automated clearing houses and intermediary 
banks, they cannot enable rapid and inexpensive money transfers especially between countries. 
For this reason, decentralised and non-traditional payments systems provide alternatives to 
streamline the intermediating processes. Decentralised systems allow users to move money 
between them and they typically rely on cryptography rather than a central authority as in 
traditional systems (Ali et al., 2014). The payments take place through a distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) or blockchain in the form of cryptocurrencies. So, decentralised solutions 
are capable of near real-time settlements, reduce transaction costs and ensure superior 
transparency and traceability of transactions.  
Non-traditional payments systems such as mobile money and P2P transfer are based on a trusted 
non-financial third party to transfer value across users and geographies, even in underbanked 
regions (WEF, 2015). Mobile money is a network that enables payments across users via a 
mobile device without requiring a bank account or a well establish financial infrastructure; 
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thanks to its features, mobile money leverages mobile communications to reach unbanked and 
underbanked individuals in developing and emerging countries (Bussmann, 2017). The P2P 
transfer directly links the local accounts of both sender and recipient satisfying users’ needs for 
speed, payer control, security and universality (Bradford and Keeton, 2012). In non-bank P2P 
payment methods both the payer and the payee need to have an account with the intermediary 
to make and receive the payment. Furthermore, both parties need to indicate a source from 
which the intermediary account and payments can be funded, generally a bank account or a 
payment card. Most of the time, the payment is cleared and settled through a book transfer from 
the intermediary account of the payer to the one of the payee, as on Amazon and PayPal 
platforms.  
Non-traditional payments schemes enable very rapid and highly transparency transactions to 
both senders and recipients and they favour financial inclusion since they do not impose specific 
financial requirements to users.  
WEF (2015) concluded that most payment innovations do not completely disrupt the existing 
payment processes, but they can act as real competitors of banks since they focus on front-end 
processes to improve customers’ experience and better satisfy their needs. Furthermore, one of 
the main targets of FinTech has always been to exceed two of the greatest limitations of the 
traditional payments: payment speed and service availability (BIS, 2016). Innovative payment 
methods seek to guarantee the transmission of the payment and the availability of funds to the 
payee in real time or near-real time reducing the delays in the clearing and settlement of 
payments.  
Lastly, FinTech innovations in the payments system ensure transparent and automatic processes 
for customers and thanks to the use of mobile devices and like they have more opportunities to 
gather data and information about customers’ preferences and attitudes; innovations with these 
advantages can threaten traditional payment schemes, especially credit cards (Bussmann, 
2017).  
 
2.1.2 Deposit and lending functions in the fintech world 
Deposit and lending are other fundamental services provided by traditional retail banks that are 
facing a strong competition from FinTech innovations and companies (Bussmann, 2017). The 
primary functions of a commercial bank are accepting deposits and granting loans and advances 
to individuals and businesses at a higher rate of interest than allowed by banks on deposit 
accounts. Retail banks receive savings from their account holders and provide an interest on the 
savings in return. Then they use the saved funds to originate loans to borrowers and they receive 
a different interest rate in return (WEF, 2015). Banks determine the availability of loans and 
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the interest rates analysing the borrowers’ risk profiles using credit scores and consequently 
they identify risk-averse or risk-seeking savers and low-risk or high-risk borrowers. Borrowers 
are served depending on each bank’s risk appetite which is generally related to the size and the 
scale of the bank even if banks are potentially more prone to serve low-risk borrowers and to 
accept deposits from risk-averse savers.   
Although deposit and lending are two traditional functions of incumbent banks, FinTech 
innovations have reached this sector and they are gaining in popularity over the last decade. 
Loans issued by FinTech players represent one third of unsecured consumer loans volume in 
the US in 2016 and they are expected to grow at a 20% yearly rate over the next five years. The 
rapid development and success of alternative lending solutions have important consequences 
on the consumer lending market and especially on retail banking (Vallee and Zeng, 2018).  
Therefore, we first try to understand what is FinTech lending, how new players operate and 
what implications they will have for the banking industry. The FinTech lending sector differs 
from traditional banking environment since it does not imply buildings, tellers and branches, 
but at the same time it enables money flows from savers to borrowers as traditional commercial 
banks do (Odinet, 2017). In the traditional banking lending, banks act as intermediaries between 
depositors and borrowers. Indeed, they lend money deposited by savers at the bank to borrowers 
and then they pay interests to customers on their deposits in return. Fintech lenders, instead, 
match directly borrowers and savers, and they do not lend money themselves, rather, funds are 
provided by investors o by partner-banks.  
After the pre-screening of loan applications by lending platforms, investors screen listed 
borrowers directly to decide whether or not to finance the loans (Vallee and Zeng, 2018). The 
role of investors in fintech lending represents a radical change in the lending market since they 
conduct activities and functions that are traditionally performed by banks. In addition, the 
authors argued that informationally sophisticated investors improve lending outcomes by 
screening listed loans using information provided by the platform, while less sophisticated 
investors do not screen investing in an average loan passively if they can break even, or not 
investing at all. As a result, sophisticated investors outperform less sophisticated ones 
increasing the volume of loans financed on the lending platforms. However, the active role of 
investors in lending platforms generally leads to an endogenous adverse selection problem 
which can impair the loans volume through both a price effect and a quantity effect. On the 
price side, as sophisticated investors are better able to identify and finance good loans, less 
sophisticated investors may face an average loan with a lower quality. Hence, less sophisticated 
investors may need a lower loan price to break even, causing a lower prevailing loan price on 
the platform and a lower amount of loan applications in the first place. On the quantity side, in 
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case of a too severe adverse selection, less sophisticated investors may not break even and exit 
the market, leading to lower loans volume. To solve the adverse selection problem and 
maximize loans volume, FinTech lending platforms focus on the pre-screening intensity and on 
the information provision to investors. If the platform pre-screening cost is initially high, the 
platform will choose a low pre-screening intensity but provides more information to lenders. 
This strategy encourages the participation of sophisticated investors, increasing the volume of 
loans financed by them even if less sophisticated investors do not take part. If instead the pre-
screening cost is low, platforms choose a high pre-screening intensity so that less sophisticated 
investors are willing to invest. Platforms simultaneously provide less information to mitigate 
the adverse selection problem caused by more sophisticated investors. Summing up, in this 
theoretical model a platform pre-screens a pool of loan applications, lists some loans on the 
platform, and provides some information to investors to facilitate their screening and investing 
decisions. Since unsophisticated investors do not screen, they are always uninformed about 
individual loans’ quality while sophisticated investors, paying a cost for information, become 
informed and identify good loans. Therefore, sophisticated investors finance only good loans 
and outperform uninformed and unsophisticated investors which suffer the adverse selection 
imposed on them.  
Given the role of investors in FinTech lending platforms, FinTech lenders do not bear any credit 
risk and therefore, they do not need to hold any capital reserves like traditional banks (Odinet, 
2017). As a result, FinTech lenders can establish lower interest rates on their products and this 
feature attracts borrowers to choose fintech lending platforms instead of traditional financial 
institutions. New lenders also differ from banks in terms of income and methods of 
underwriting. Unlike retail banks, the income of FinTech players comes from commissions and 
fees that receive from the origination of loans or from their distribution. Lastly, besides 
traditional methods of underwriting (for example FICO scores), FinTech lenders apply 
mathematical and machine learning processes to define the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers. 
FinTech lenders generally act as “direct funding lenders” or as “intermediary lenders” (Odinet, 
2017). In the first case, FinTech lenders (also called “balance-sheet lenders”) are online 
companies that originate loans internally and provide them directly to borrowers. These lenders 
keep the loans on their books until the debt is retired, and they generally obtain financial funds 
to make the loans from outside investors or from their own borrowed capital. FinTech lenders 
are intermediary lenders when they create a collaboration with a third-party financial institution. 
In this business model, the financial institution makes the loans to the borrowers, but all 
underwriting and processing of the application is done by the fintech lender which generally 
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acquires the loan after its origination. With this strategy, the FinTech lenders do not bear any 
credit risk because they purchase the loans directly from the partner-originating banks and they 
do so with investors’ capital. Therefore, it is the investors who bear the risk that the online 
borrowers could default, given their participation in the fintech platforms. 
Another important aspect in the analysis of FinTech lending is understanding why this 
phenomenon has come up over the last decade and what factors drove its successful 
development. When after the 2008 financial crisis traditional lenders pulled back on providing 
credit access, especially to consumers, FinTech lenders began to successfully operate in the 
financial industry filling the lending gap (Odinet, 2017). As already discussed for the FinTech 
phenomenon, the global financial crisis caused a reduction in customers’ trust towards banks 
and an increase in safety measures around loans (e.g. higher capital requirements) decided by 
regulators and supervisory authorities. The result was a tightening of loan requirements by 
banks while the loss of confidence led to a lending gap with a considerable portion of 
individuals and businesses with higher risk profiles unserved by financial institutions 
(WEF,2015). The increase in regulatory measures caused two major shifts in the financial 
market (Odinet, 2017). First, new rules made “the cost of doing business” for many financial 
institutions more expensive. Second, incumbents were forced to “reprice” their financial 
products and services against higher underwriting and compliance costs. As the cost of credit 
increased, many consumers and small businesses decided to turn to new players to access 
capital. FinTech lenders were able to fill the credit gap using technological advances and 
machine learning to reduce costs, speed up and automate loan processes and reach underserved 
consumers and SMEs. Additionally, they can satisfy borrowers that traditional banks generally 
find too risky. Indeed, commercial banks take risks themselves and they focus only on low-risk 
consumers while alternative lenders provide an online marketplace where lenders can choose 
the desired portfolio. Most providers, such as online and P2P lending platforms, match directly 
funds of borrowers and savers; further, fintech lenders rely solely on investors while 
commercial banks need to use their customers’ deposits and funds from asset-backed securities 
to make loans (Odinet, 2017). For these reasons, fintech players can ensure flexible, fast, low-
cost and customer-oriented alternatives (WEF, 2015).  
The World Economic Forum (2015) also analysed the potential role of FinTech lenders with 
respect to traditional banks. The first potential scenario is the disintermediation of financial 
agents where alternative lending platforms successfully replace traditional banks in matching 
risk-averse savers and low-risk borrowers. The consequence is a loss of incumbents’ market 
share to alternative lending platforms since, offering lower interest rates and more streamlined 
processes, new entrants also attract and retain low-risk borrowers. As traditional banks are still 
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trapped by legacy processes, obsolete technologies and strict capital requirements, they cannot 
adapt quickly enough, and the intensified competition of alternative lenders will generate 
pressure on the spread earned between interests paid to savers and received from borrowers, 
leading to an erosion of banks’ margins and deposits.   
In the second potential scenario alternative lending platforms act complementing traditional 
intermediaries. As FinTech lenders are unable to build sufficient customer awareness and trust, 
especially in low-risk lending segment, they create partnerships with existing banks where 
alternative lenders and banks cater to different classes of investors and borrowers. Traditional 
financial institutions continue to operate with low-risk market guiding high-risk individuals, 
who do not meet minimum lending requirements, to fintech lenders. Thanks to the collaboration 
between banks and FinTech players, customers fulfil their financing needs and gain access to 
savings and lending products that best suit their preferences. Furthermore, traditional 
incumbents also reach and serve high-risk customers without losing other business lines and 
taking high risks. However, the profile of customers served by banks could become increasingly 
homogenised given the possibility of savers and borrowers to switch to alternative lending 
platforms. 
In the third potential scenario, traditional banks react quickly to the competition of alternative 
lending players revolutionizing their technologies and processes or directly acquiring FinTech 
lenders. With these strategies traditional banks develop alternative adjudication methods and 
capabilities, more streamlined lending processes and greater efficiency offering lower interest 
rates and catering to more borrowers who traditionally are underserved. The results are 
significant improvement in customer experience, greater availability of loans and investment 
opportunities, improved profitability and reduced leakage during lending application process. 
Nevertheless, banks will need to diversify their savings and lending products from the 
traditional one-size-fits-all approach to serve various customers’ needs and to face the 
competition against diverse fintech lenders.  
Summing up, the authors (WEF, 2015) identified two likely implications that are common to 
all potential scenarios. Firstly, the choice of savers to turn to FinTech lending platforms as short 
and medium-term investment vehicles could cause an erosion in traditional deposits and 
investment products offered by banks and financial institutions leading to some balance sheet 
shrinkage and a negative impact on capital ratio. Secondly, it could become more difficult for 
banks to measure customers’ creditworthiness on a consistent basis since clients’ savings and 
credit portfolios could be distributed over many alternative platforms that use different 
reporting standards and methods.  
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2.1.3 Does Peer-to-Peer lending really threaten commercial banks?  
Peer-to-peer (henceforth “P2P”) lending is the most successful FinTech lending model in the 
consumer credit market (Balyuk, 2018). The term P2P describes the relationship between two 
parties without the need for a central intermediary (Milne and Parboteeah, 2016) and indeed, 
the peculiarity of this innovation is the direct matching of borrowers and lenders through online 
lending platforms. In P2P lending borrowers access the online platform, request loans online, 
and they provide information about their current financial situation, like income or open credit 
lines (Bachmann et al., 2011).  
Individual and institutional investors can choose to invest independently, within investment 
groups, or algorithmically (Morse, 2015). Lenders generally do not fund entire loans, but rather 
they may diversify across borrowers who get financed only if investors’ bids reach a threshold. 
If the bids reach the threshold, the loan closes at an interest rate assigned to the borrower by the 
lending platforms according to his risk-scoring.  
P2P lending platforms are affected by information asymmetry which causes a principal-agent 
problem between investors and borrowers. As in all FinTech lending models, borrowers’ loans 
are financed by platform’ investors who need to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness. Lenders 
want therefore to get as much valid information about the borrower as possible, but, on the other 
hand, borrowers may hide some of their characteristics in order to get the loan and a low interest 
rate. To overcome the information asymmetry, P2P platforms force borrowers to provide 
information about their current financial situation. Investors receive an overview of borrowers’ 
financial characteristics such as credit ratings, detailed information on income and monthly 
expenses, house ownership or the debt to income ratio. After defining borrowers’ 
creditworthiness, P2P lenders go on with the screening and pricing process (Balyuk, 2018). 
Investors screen borrowers using their proprietary algorithms and additional local and 
macroeconomic information that is not available to banks. Although P2P lending started with 
unsophisticated investors as lenders, the considerable growth of this innovation attracted 
institutional investors who have insights into credit market conditions and characteristics thanks 
to their strategic position. Lastly, P2P lending platforms use fully automated algorithms to price 
and underwrite loans significantly reducing screening costs for investors. The automation of 
the entire application, verification and funding process enables P2P lenders to screen small 
loans that are generally rejected by banks because of their low profitability.  
Milne and Parboteeah (2016) focused on the competitive advantages of P2P lending platforms 
over traditional commercial banks. P2P platforms offer better rates of return on deposits and 
lower fees for borrowers than traditional banks. The automation of the entire process, the lack 
of any intermediary, and the focused nature of their activities guarantee low administrative and 
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overhead costs for setting up P2P platforms. In addition, since investors bear all the risks of the 
process (first, the borrowers’ default), they are compensated with much higher rates of return. 
Secondly, P2P lending platforms provide greater access to credit, especially to some categories 
of borrowers that are generally refused by traditional banks. Borrowers who do not meet the 
more stringent criteria that banks place on loans can find alternative lenders who are willing to 
take on a greater risk providing additional lending services.  
Another reason for the growth of P2P lending is linked to the direct matching of borrowers and 
savers. Thanks to this feature, P2P lending offers a form of finance that generates more social 
benefits and externalities. Customers, in this case borrowers, are the hearth of P2P lending 
activities, while banks and other financial intermediaries focus more on their market power and 
profits without an adequate regard to the interests of their clients. 
Lastly, an important advantage of P2P lending is technological innovation which allows to 
improve the quality and speed of services to both borrowers and lenders. The authors argued 
that the majority of banks’ budget goes towards maintaining existing system rather than creating 
innovative new ones. Furthermore, retail banks tend to have large, legacy systems that cannot 
be easily replaced because of the obsolete infrastructure built around them. 
Analysing how P2P lending impacts the credit provided by banks, Balyuk (2018) argued that 
FinTech lenders influence the fundamentals in the consumer credit market by improving 
information between borrowers and investors. Furthermore, the author found out that banks 
tend to increase access to credit for consumers who receive loans from P2P lending platforms 
since alternative lenders guarantee a greater accuracy in processing customers’ information and 
screening loans applications. Therefore, FinTech innovations in the lending sector can bring 
benefits reducing imperfections and frictions in the consumer credit market, and consequently 
they generate information spillovers to banks which are more prone to enlarge their customer 
base also including underserved borrowers.  
Although FinTech lenders take away part of banks’ customers offering low interest rates and 
providing more tailored financial solutions, Milne and Parboteeah (2016) asserted that the 
development of P2P platforms will not lead to the end of the banking system. P2P platforms 
and FinTech lenders in general conduct activities traditionally assigned exclusively to 
commercial banks, attract both lenders and borrowers with better rates, and ensure faster, 
automatic and transparent processes, but they lack one core banking activity: liquidity 
provision. According to the authors, the principal activity of a commercial bank is liquidity 
provision rather than intermediation. Banks ensure their deposit customers the possibility to 
draw deposits on demand either by withdrawing cash or by using bank payment instruments 
and their borrowers the flexibility in their use of loan facilities. Customers are willing to receive 
43 
 
lower interest rates of return on deposits or higher costs of borrowing in return for the liquidity 
services provided by retail banks. Milne and Parboteeah (2016) underlined that P2P lenders are 
at a disadvantage compared to banks in providing such liquidity services, as they do not have 
access to money market funding or to central bank liquidity. For this reason, P2P and FinTech 
lenders should be considered as complementary agents not in a direct competition with retail 
banks which are expected to set up their own P2P platforms or collaborate with existing ones. 
Thanks to FinTech innovations, banks can improve the availability of credit to customers who 
generally do not meet the requirements for conventional bank lending, increasing the stability 
and the efficiency of banks and of the banking system as a whole.  
 
2.1.4 Crowdfunding: a new source of funding 
Crowdfunding is considered by McKinsey & Co. (2016) as another FinTech innovation which 
may cause disruption in the traditional banking system, albeit to a lesser extent with respect to 
innovative payments systems and fintech lending. Crowdfunding emerged as an alternative way 
for entrepreneurial ventures to secure funds without the need for venture capital or other 
traditional forms of investment (Mollick, 2013). Crowdfunding derives from the combination 
of micro-finance and crowdsourcing, even if it represents a unique category of fundraising, 
facilitated by the growth of Internet.  Crowdfunding is defined as an open call essentially 
through the Internet which allows entrepreneurs to obtain necessary fundings, either in the form 
of donations or in exchange for some forms of reward or voting rights (Belleflamme et al., 
2013). In other words, crowdfunding is the collection of funds through a web platform from a 
large group of backers to fund a project or a start-up (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Thanks to the 
use of web platforms and the consequent reduction in transaction costs, it is possible to collect 
a small amount from a large pool of funders, and this can result in considerable amounts of 
capital. Second, the use of the Internet makes it possible to directly link funders with individuals 
or organizations looking for funding without the need for active intermediaries.  
Crowdfunding differs from other funding methods because of the relationship between funders 
and founders which varies by context and the nature of the funding effort (Mollick, 2013). In 
case of art or human projects funders act as philanthropists who do not receive any direct return 
for their donations. The second model is the lending model in which entrepreneurs obtain funds 
in the form of loans. In return for their contributions, funders receive fixed periodic income and 
repayment of the original principal investment (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Entrepreneurs using 
lending model seek passive investors because they are simply interested in raising money and 
not using the crowd as customers (Onnée and Renault, 2016). The third approach is called 
reward-based crowdfunding in which funders receive a non-financial reward for backing a 
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project. Funders get some privileges for example allowing them access to products realized by 
funded projects at an earlier date, better price, or with some other special benefits. Finally, the 
equity crowdfunding treats funders as investors, giving them stakes or other consideration in 
return for their fundings. In equity crowdfunding contributors receive securities which allow 
them to get a portion of the profits and vote at general meetings (Onnée and Renault, 2016). 
Using this model, the crowdfunding platform gives investors the possibility to finance projects 
already listed by experts and become shareholders of the funded company.  
Crowdfunding can be an alternative or a complement to traditional financial circuits (Onnée 
and Renault, 2016). Indeed, through crowdfunding an individual or an organization can avoid 
having to turn to traditional banks, which tend to be reluctant to grant loans to some categories 
of customers. In addition, start-ups and small businesses may run into difficulties in attracting 
external finance during their initial stage through both bank loans and equity capital 
(Belleflamme et al., 2013). Therefore, many projects and ventures remain unfunded due to a 
lack of sufficient value promised to financial investors or due to difficulties in convincing them. 
Crowdfunding has emerged as a new source of finance which helps firms raise funds from large 
audiences rather than from a small group of specialized lenders. The concept of crowdfunding 
is using the crowd to obtain ideas, feedback, and solutions to develop corporate activities. Many 
entrepreneurs just need small amounts of capital to start a one-time project which is generally 
financed by friends and family. However, crowdfunding is also a useful source for 
entrepreneurial seed capital enabling entrepreneurs to obtain the initial money necessary for the 
establishment of their business (Mollick, 2013).  
Besides fundraising, crowdfunding permits to test the good or service proposed by the project 
as a sort of pre-selling to potential clients (Onnée and Renault, 2016). The projects are presented 
on the crowdfunding platform and this is a way for the entrepreneur to promote his projects and 
to benefit from the platform’s viral potential. In addition, creators are invited to share their 
projects via social networks, directly involving the community which becomes a driving force 
of the project. Lastly, project developers can improve their credibility to traditional financiers 
(traditional banks and venture capitalists) trough successful crowdfunding campaigns.  
The four models of crowdfunding (donation model, lending model, reward-based model and 
equity crowdfunding) differ in terms of complexity and level of uncertainty (Wilson and 
Testoni, 2014). The donation model is the simplest one because the only risk is that the project 
does not achieve its goal, even if the funder of the project does not expect any material or 
financial return from his investment. Although equity crowdfunding is the smallest category of 
the entire crowdfunding in terms of volume, it is the most complex.  
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We focus on equity crowdfunding characteristics and risks because it seems to be the most 
disruptive innovation for the financial and banking sectors.  
In equity crowdfunding the investor buys a share in the company, but he also needs to estimate 
its value. Further, the level of uncertainty is very high since this model is based on the 
entrepreneur’s ability to create equity value in the company, which is very difficult to assess. 
Equity crowdfunding is receiving greater attention from policymakers and academics since it 
is a precious source of funds especially for start-ups which generally have limited access to 
finance and often do not command assets to be used as guarantees for bank loans. Young and 
small firms can obtain equity funding from three traditional sources: founders, family and 
friends; angel investors; and venture capitalists. The role of angel investors and venture 
capitalists has increased substantially over the last decade because after the financial crisis 
banks have become more reluctant to finance start-ups due to their greater riskiness and lack of 
collateral. Equity crowdfunding has the same objectives of business angels and venture 
capitalists, but it departs from these models because transactions are intermediated by an online 
platform. Wilson and Testoni (2014) described the key characteristics of equity crowdfunding 
with respect to angel investors and venture capitalists. Firstly, equity crowdfunding mostly 
operates in the financing segment covered by angel investors, although authorities introduced 
upper limits to the capital that can be raised from non-qualified investors, as the crowd. 
Secondly, as angel investors, the financial return is not the only reason for an investment in 
equity crowdfunding. In crowdfunding investors also finance start-ups for social and emotional 
benefits besides the will to help start-ups initiate a successful business, exploit tax reliefs and 
achieve meaningful financial returns. In addition, the investment spectrum of equity 
crowdfunding is typically broader than angel investors and venture capitalists since investment 
motives of the large public tend to be quite heterogenous. Although equity crowdfunding has 
become a valuable alternative source of funds for start-ups, and it is increasing in terms of 
volume, it is not risk-free. Indeed, the characteristics of crowdfunding can make investments in 
young firms even riskier, and they can exacerbate the information asymmetry problems 
common to seed and early-stage financing. While business angels and venture capitalists 
perform due diligence to evaluate the firm, crowdinvestors have less incentive to perform it 
since this process ca be costly, and crowdfunding investments are generally small. Moreover, 
crowdfunders likely lack the expertise and skill to adequately perform due diligence. This 
happens because the large audience often includes non-professional investors, who do not have 
the knowledge or capabilities to evaluate a company. Finally, the company valuation conducted 
by crowdinvestors may be affected by biases and herding behaviour (Agrawal et al., 2013). The 
authors argued that the propensity of individual funders to invest in a project increases with 
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accumulated capital potentially leading to herding because the investment decision of a funder 
may be affected by those of the other investors. Furthermore, the authors asserted that funders 
and entrepreneurs are typically initially overoptimistic about potential outcomes.  
Regarding investments, equity crowdfunding is often based on standardised contracts provided 
by the platform. However, investments into start-ups generally require customised contracts in 
order to align the interests of the entrepreneurs to those of the funder. Business angels and 
venture capitalists tend to invest in a portfolio of companies to diversify their risk. This strategy 
might be replicated by equity crowdfunders considering that they are exposed to a variety of 
projects. However, non-professional investors, as the crowd is, could not understand the 
strategic importance of the diversification and therefore, they could potentially concentrate all 
their investments in a single project or company.  
Finally, equity crowdfunding tends to exacerbate the information asymmetry problems that 
typically characterize early-stage firms. Indeed, entrepreneurs always have more information 
than investors about their projects or ventures (Agrawal et al., 2013). In equity crowdfunding 
the informational asymmetry increases due to the geographical distance between funders and 
entrepreneurs. So, it is particularly difficult for funders to perform due diligence in person, 
assess the true ability of the entrepreneur or the underlying quality of the project. The 
consequence is a market failure in the form of adverse selection. Indeed, if funders discount the 
value of the projects on the platform as a result, high-quality venture will not raise funds on the 
platform because they cannot get a “fair” price for their equity in that platform. The risk is that 
adverse selection increases the cost of capital to the point where only low-quality venture will 
choose crowdfunding, while high-quality ventures will continue to turn to business angels and 
venture capitalists. 
Crowdfunding business model also has some limits in post-investment support and monitoring. 
Business angels and venture capitalist provide not only fundings to start-ups, but they are also 
directly involved in increasing the value of the company, while the support provided by 
crowdinvestors is generally less valuable. The crowd makes small investments, and it has less 
incentive to provide active support to the company due to the lower return for their investment 
(Agrawal et al., 2013). Moreover, the information asymmetry, typical of early-stage financing, 
also characterises the post-investment phase limiting the monitoring activity of the crowd.  
The monitoring activity is particularly important in investments that take 5-10 years or more to 
produce a return (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). Equity investments may succeed or fail, and 
therefore it is necessary to elaborate a positive exit strategy for the investors. The exit of 
investors can be through an IPO or a M&A, but in equity crowdfunding the path to a positive 
exit can be longer and even less likely.  
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In conclusion, the lack of pre-investment screening and due diligence, weaker investment 
contracts and poorer post-investment support and monitoring can make equity crowdfunding 
transaction significantly riskier than business angels and venture capitalists ones.  
After describing the characteristics and the risks of equity crowdfunding, we try to understand 
whether these innovations really affect the banking system. Crowdfunding, as other FinTech 
innovations, has the potential to replace significant parts of the banking system.  
Blaseg and Koetter (2015) analysed the relationship between crowdfunding and banks to verify 
when ventures and entrepreneurs are more willing to turn to crowdfunding rather than to 
traditional bank loans. The authors underlined that the financial crisis of 2008 increased the 
difficulties that young and small firms face in raising external finance. As a result, the volume 
of equity financing from venture capitalists decreased significantly and credit supply tightened.  
Early stage financing is typically characterised by greater riskiness, information asymmetries 
and high relative transaction costs. Crowdfunding established itself as a valid alternative for 
younger ventures since it ensures lower transaction costs thanks to the use of web platforms. 
The authors analysed whether and how the credit shock transmitted by banks made young 
ventures and entrepreneurs more inclined to seek crowdfunding as alternative source of external 
finance. Focusing on a large group of young venture in Germany, Blaseg and Koetter (2015) 
found out that the relationship of a young venture with a bailed-out bank increases the 
probability that the venture uses crowdfunding. Moreover, after the financial crisis banks were 
forced to handle their lending more restrictively due to more sever rules. Therefore, ventures 
that cannot demonstrate their creditworthiness remain unfinanced and they decide to turn to 
equity crowdfunding instead of bank financing. Young and small firms are more likely to use 
crowdfunding also when they have few tangible assets. Tangible assets allow to reduce the 
financial loss for investors in case of bankruptcy and the information asymmetries costs if 
ventures pledge their assets as collateral.  
Summing up, crowdfunding is a valuable alternative source of funding mainly for young 
ventures and small entrepreneurs, especially when their banks are affected by credit crunch. 
Crowdfunding, as FinTech lending, is a potential threat to commercial banks because it can 
reach some categories of customers who are generally underserved by traditional financial 
institutions. Banks are adapting crowdfunding platforms’ business models to meet small loan 
applications with transparent and customised products. However, crowdfunding innovation is 
not risk-free, and the real issue is whether crowdfunding will be able to overcome its main 
limits: lack of expertise and knowledge to perform due diligence, information asymmetry 
problems, lack of adequate monitoring and successful exit for investors. Despite some 
successful equity crowdfunding cases, the crowdfunding industry still lacks “a sufficient track 
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record to assess its ability to create value for both investors and entrepreneurs” (Wilson and 
Testoni, 2014).  
For these reasons, most of young ventures are still more prone to apply to traditional banks, 
business angels or venture capitalists who provide knowledge of the market, expertise and 
financial capabilities. Lastly, there is a huge disparity in size between the crowdfunding and 
traditional banking industries, and this means that crowdfunding is not currently considered as 
a realistic alternative to banks.  
 
2.2 Banks’ performance and profitability 
In the previous paragraph we focused on three FinTech innovations which McKinsey & Co. 
(2016) described as the most concrete threats to the banking system. We analysed innovative 
payment system, FinTech lending agents and platforms, and equity crowdfunding in relation to 
traditional commercial banks’ activities and functions. From the analysis it emerged that 
FinTech innovations threaten the banking system since they have the potential to overcome 
some limits and disadvantages of traditional incumbents. Innovative payments systems 
guarantee faster, cheaper and more transparent processes to their customers improving their 
experience and better satisfying their evolving needs. FinTech lending companies and platforms 
reach categories of borrowers (high-risk borrowers such as SMEs and individuals) who are 
generally underserved by traditional banks. In addition, alternative lending ensures lower 
transaction and compliance costs thanks the direct matching between investors and borrowers 
and the lighter regulation. Lastly, equity crowdfunding, in particular, emerges as a valid and 
valuable alternative source of external finance for young ventures and start-ups. With respect 
to innovative payments systems and FinTech lending, crowdfunding is characterized by a small 
volume in the financial industry, but it allows small projects and ventures to get funding. As 
FinTech lending, crowdfunding satisfies customers’ and firms’ funding applications which are 
typically rejected by commercial banks due to their greater riskiness.  
These FinTech innovations threaten the banking system because they better meet customers’ 
evolving needs and preferences, they take away clients to traditional commercial banks, and 
they guarantee lower costs, higher rates of return and less severe requirements. But, do FinTech 
innovations have tangible effects on commercial banks in terms of performance and 
profitability? Does the collaboration between traditional banks and fintech companies improve 
banks’ efficiency? 
Before developing a model to analyse these issues, we first need to define bank’s profitability 
and how to measure it.  
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2.2.1 Banks’ performance 
In this work we refer to banks’ performance as the ability of banks to generate sustainable 
profitability (ECB, 2010). Profitability is essential for a bank to maintain its ongoing activity 
and for investors to obtain fair returns. As any profit-seeking organization, banks need to 
generate profits against unexpected losses and depletion of capital base. So, the ultimate 
purpose of a bank is to preserve and create value for its owners, even if various stakeholders of 
a bank can focus on different aspects of profitability, depending on their perspectives. 
Depositors, for example, worry about a bank’s long-term ability to look after their savings. Debt 
holders, instead, look at the ability of the bank to meet its obligations, while equity holders 
focus on profit generation to secure a future return on their current holding. Despite banks’ 
greater complexity, their performance is still driven by earnings, efficiency, risk-taking and 
leverage. As mentioned above, the ultimate objective of a bank is the creation of profit and 
earnings, but it is also important to account their composition and volatility. Efficiency is 
defined by the ECB as the ability of the bank to generate revenues from a given amount of 
assets and to make profit from a given source of income. We will discuss bank’s efficiency later 
in relation to a potential collaboration with FinTech players. Risk-taking refers to the 
adjustment of earnings for the undertaken risks to generate them. Lastly, leverage might 
improve bank’s results in the upswing acting as a multiplier, but at the same time it might also 
increase the probability of a bank’ failure due to rare and unexpected losses. 
There is a great variety of measures to asses bank performance with differences among groups 
of stakeholders. The ECB (2010) splits performance measurements in three categories: 
traditional, economic and market-based measures.  
ROE (return on equity), along with ROA (return on assets), is one of the most widely used 
measures of corporate financial performance adopted by analysts, consultants, financial 
managers, and shareholders (De Wet and Du Toit, 2006).  
ROE is measured dividing the net income by the average total equity, and it can be broken up 
into three separate ratios following the “Dupont analysis”: 
 𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 𝑋 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
 𝑋 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
   (Hess and Francis, 2004). 
The three components measure, respectively, actual profitability, utilization of assets and the 
gearing of the company. For banks, it makes sense to combine the last two components into one 
equity capital utilization measure. In fact, unlike in industrial firms, a bank’s gearing is not a 
particularly distinguishing factor and it is generally strongly affected by regulatory capital 
requirements. The two remaining sub-components of ROE could then be interpreted as 
operational and capital efficiency respectively. Therefore, ROE can be improved by increasing 
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profitability, by using assets more efficiently or by increasing financial leverage (De Wet and 
Du Toit, 2006). 
ROE is the most popular measure of performance: (i) it directly assesses the financial return of 
a shareholder’s investment; (ii) it is easily available for many categories of stakeholders; and 
(iii) it facilitates the comparison between different companies or sectors of the economy (ECB, 
2010). However, this ratio has some flaws and limits as performance indicator (De Wet and Du 
Toit, 2006). The authors argued that the earnings of a company can be manipulated legally 
within the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) changing some accounting 
policies. In addition, ROE is calculated after the cost of debt, but before considering the cost of 
own capital. As mentioned above, ROE increases with a higher financial gearing, but if this last 
goes beyond a certain level, it may cause a fall in the company value and in the share price. In 
this case, an increase in ROE may lead to wealth destruction, which is in contrast with the 
principle of shareholder value creation. Higher gearing and higher asset turnover, which are not 
necessarily beneficial, can cause a dangerous increase in ROE.  
The ECB (2010) underlined that during the 2008 financial crisis ROE failed to discriminate the 
best performing banks from bad ones in terms of long-term sustainability of their results. In 
some cases, the banks with the highest ROE were those worst hit by the crisis. Indeed, ROE is 
a short-term indicator which provides an overview of the banks’ current health and for this 
reason, it cannot take into account long-term strategies, long-term damages caused by negative 
events, and measures with long-term impact. So, ROE is not a good indicator of banks’ 
sustainable performance when changes derive from one-shot events which cannot be replicated 
in the future (e.g. extraordinary events during a crisis). ROE does not also consider long-term 
issues such as restructuring or improvement in capital ratios. For example, during a crisis many 
banks undertake actions, such as restructuring, to return generating value in the long-term. 
However, these strategies generally imply negative effects in terms of costs, involving further 
pressures on ROE and the current performance.  
Moreover, ROE can be a misleading ratio since it is generally influenced by seasonal factors 
and it exposes banks to higher unexpected risk levels. The last criticism of ROE analysed by 
the ECB is that this ratio is not risk-sensitive, and it completely ignores important risk elements, 
such as the quality of assets, the cost of risk, the risk concentration, and the solvency situation. 
So, the ECB concluded that ROE is not a stand-alone performance measure, and therefore, it is 
necessary to develop alternative and additional performance indicators.  
Other traditional indicators to measure performance are:  
-(i) ROA, calculated as: ROA =  
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
;  
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-(ii) cost to income ratio (CIR), calculated as 𝐶𝐼𝑅 =  
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
, which estimates the 
ability of the financial institution to generate profits from a given revenue stream; 
-(iii) net interest margin, computed as net interest margin =  
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
, which indicates 
the capacity of banks’ intermediation function to generate income.  
 
Banks’ performance can also be assessed through economic measures such as EVA (economic 
value added) and RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) (ECB, 2010). These indicators assess 
the economic results generated by a company from its economic assets, mainly focusing on 
efficiency as a central element of performance. EVA is defined as the excess of adjusted earning 
over the opportunity cost of the capital involved:  
EVA= Adjusted earnings – c*K 
Where earnings are adjusted to better represent economic earnings in accordance with GAAP, 
c is the opportunity cost of equity, and K is the amount of equity used by the unit being 
measured (Kimball,1998). From the ECB (2010) perspective, EVA considers the opportunity 
cost for stockholders to hold equity in a bank, measuring whether it generates an economic rate 
of return higher than the cost of invested capital to increase the market value of the company:  
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 − (𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)
− (𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡) 
The value of the EVA can be improved in three ways: by increasing adjust earnings, either 
trough improved margins or additional sales; by reducing the equity capital used; or by reducing 
the cost of equity (Kimball, 1998). However, any change to improve EVA requires managers 
to face trade-offs among the key variables. If managers decide to expand the activity to increase 
earnings, such expansion will lead to greater investments and so higher equity capital. In this 
case, EVA will increase only if the additional earnings generated by expansion exceed the 
marginal cost of the additional equity capital involved. Otherwise, a company may increase its 
use of debt and decrease the amount (K) of equity used. But, if K decreases, the riskiness of the 
equity investment will increase and so c, the cost of equity, will increase. In this situation, EVA 
will improve only if the percentage decline in K is greater than the percentage increase in c.  
Considering the flaws of ROE discussed above and the trade-offs that managers need to face 
using EVA, the EVA system is considered superior to more conventional performance 
measures. Managers of banks and companies should use performance indicators to identify the 
best investment decisions in terms of earnings and use of equity capital. If managers only focus 
on maximizing earnings and adopt ROE to value a project, they will not consider the 
opportunity cost of capital and therefore, they will choose a project with positive and increasing 
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earnings, but with an inefficient use of equity. A firm that adopt only ROE as performance 
indicator will tend to underinvest, grow more slowly than it should, and generate lower returns 
for shareholders. More popular performance measures as ROE and ROA may suggest that the 
bank is performing well, when in fact it may be reducing its value to its shareholders. Using 
EVA, firms may avoid these outcomes because managers would be induced to manage the 
internal trade-off between growth and the return to additional equity. Maximizing EVA, a firm 
would invest until the last project generated a ROE just equal to the opportunity cost of the 
equity capital employed. Despite the advantages of EVA in terms of incentive system and 
shareholder value creation, it is not the best measure of performance because projects with 
negative EVA will not be chosen considering the current EVA figures, even though the future 
annual EVA is enough to justify the investment (De Wet and Du Toit, 2006). 
As discussed above, one of the main limits of ROE as performance indicator is that ROE is not 
risk-sensitive and so, it ignores any risk element in the banks’ activity. The second economic 
performance measure analysed by the ECB (2010) is the risk-adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC) which measures the expected result over economic capital. 
RAROC is one of the risk-adjusted performance measures (RAPM), used in the banking 
industry as a guide for an efficient asset allocation, performance evaluation, and capital 
structure decisions in complex financial institutions (Geyfman, 2005). After the strengthening 
of regulatory constraint on bank total capital, one of the banks’ main objective is to maximize 
risk-adjusted profitability. One way to reach this goal is to minimize the risk of each activity 
undertaken by the bank. RAPM have been developed during the last decade to compare the 
risk-adjusted return against an appropriate hurdle rate of the bank’s cost of capital or the 
opportunity cost to stockholders in holding equity in the bank. RAROC measures the 
performance of a bank as the ratio between the risk-adjusted return of a business activity and 
the capital employed to finance it.   
 To identify successful operations and projects, performance measures need to consider the 
underlying level of risk associated with banks’ activity, and they need to face the trade-off 
between growth, return and risk (Kimball, 1998). To evaluate banks’ performance, RAROC 
approach assigns capital to business units as part of a process of assessing the risk-adjusted rate 
of return and the economic value added of each business unit (Zaik et al.,1996). This system 
allows to allocate capital to individual business units and activities of banks in accordance with 
their anticipated economic value added (EVA) (ECB, 2010). With respect to ROE, RAROC is 
a more reliable measure to evaluate the performance of business units, given the focus on the 
underlying risk level (Zaik et al., 1996). If the RAROC of a business unit is greater than the 
cost equity, which is the shareholders’ minimum required rate of return, it means that the 
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business unit is creating value for shareholders. But if RAROC is below the cost of equity, the 
business unit is reducing shareholder value. However, the use of rates of return in RAROC, 
ROE or ROA does not allow to quantify how much value is being created or destroyed by an 
operation. For this reason, managers, who use only RAROC or any rate-of-return to measure 
performance, are induced to underinvest. To maximizing the shareholder value, a bank should 
undertake all projects that exceed the cost of capital, but if managers are rewarded exclusively 
on the basis of ROE or RAROC, they are more likely to refuse value increasing projects that 
will reduce their average return. Therefore, Zaik et al. (1996) suggested using the “economic 
profit” also called “residual income” of the activity to measure the performance and to create 
right investment incentives for managers.  
About RAROC, the ECB (2010) underlined a similarity with EVA because both approaches 
link a bank’s profit with its cost of capital, even if RAROC goes further because it adjusts the 
value-added in relation to the capital needed. RAROC is theoretically the most relevant measure 
of performance since it compares economic return against risk. However, it’s difficult to 
calculate RAROC without having access to internal data and making strong assumptions. In 
addition, RAROC seems to be a more appropriate tool for activities with robust techniques for 
measuring risk, such as credit risk. For these reasons, academics are reluctant to consider 
RAROC a valid alternative tool to analyse and measure performance of business activities.  
The ECB (2010) concluded the analysis of performance measures focusing on market-based 
indicators which characterise how capital markets value the activity of any company, compared 
with its estimated accounting or economic value. The most commonly market-based metrics 
include: (i) the price-earnings ratio (P/E), which is the ratio of the company’s financial results 
over its share price; (ii) the price-to-book value (P/B), which relates the market value of equity 
to its book value; (iii) the total shareholder return (TSR), which is the ratio of dividends and 
increase of the stock value over the market stock price; and (iv) the credit default swap (CDS), 
which expresses the cost of insuring an unsecured bond of the institution for a given time period.  
Summing up, ROE and ROA are the most widely used among traditional performance measures 
in the banking sector and many other industries. ROE is an internal performance measure of 
shareholder value, and it is by far the most popular indicator since it can be easily assessed, and 
it provides a direct valuation of the financial return of a shareholder’s investment. However, 
ROE has some limits and flaws: (i) it ignores any risk assessment; (ii) it is a short-term indicator 
which does not consider any long-term strategy or long-term issues of the company; and (iii) it 
can be subject to manipulation in case of lack of data.  
Considering these limits, academics analysed alternative tools and indicators to measure 
performance of banks, in particular the so-called risk-adjusted performance measures (RAPM). 
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Risk has become a fundamental component in assessing banks’ performance after the 2008 
financial crisis and the consequent strengthening of banks capital requirements. RAROC allows 
banks to assign capital to individual business units according to their underlying level of risk. 
RAROC is theoretically considered a more reliable performance measure than ROE in terms of 
risk assessment, but this ratio is not out of limits and disadvantages. To assess bank performance 
using this ratio, it is necessary to have access to internal data and to make strong assumptions 
about banks’ activities. Some authors (De Wet and Du Toit, 2006; EBA, 2010; Kimball, 1998) 
also consider EVA as performance measure, which is based on the concept of opportunity cost. 
Applying EVA, banks expect to obtain better decision-making by their managers since they are 
forced to include the opportunity cost of equity when making investment and operating 
decisions (Kimball, 1998). In addition, the author argues that EVA is superior to the more 
conventional ROE since it requires managers to face trade-off among its key variables: 
earnings, cost of capital and amount of equity employed. However, as any other incentive 
compensation system, EVA system can be manipulated by managers to maximize their 
compensation without necessarily increasing the profits of the company. In this case, managers 
juggle the EVA based system to maximize the current incentive compensation at the expenses 
of future reported performance.  
 
One of the main drivers of banks’ performance is efficiency together with earnings, risk-taking 
and leverage (ECB, 2010). Efficiency and effective utilization have always been key objectives 
of banks and financial institutions (Spong et al., 1995). In the last few years the emphasis to 
banking efficiency has increased due to several recent events: increasing competition for 
financial services, technological and financial innovation, banking consolidation, and the 
increasing competition from non-bank players. All these events induced banks to focus more 
attention on controlling costs and providing services and products efficiently. Innovation in 
technology, especially in terms of improvements in communications and data processing, is 
also adding emphasis to efficiency. FinTech innovations give banks and other financial 
institutions opportunities and solutions to raise productivity and efficiency using new 
technological instruments. Banks can increase their efficiency automating processes and 
operations, introducing new financial products and services, and competing more directly with 
each other. Much of the banking consolidation movement is motivated by the hope of increasing 
efficiency. Companies generally perform acquisitions to reduce costs of internal operations, 
exploit potential synergies, and eliminate overlapping offices, personnel, and other duplicative 
resources and services. Banks can get similar advantages in case of collaborations or 
acquisitions of non-bank players such as FinTech companies (Darolles, 2016). FinTech players 
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have a strong competitive advantage thanks to technological innovation, but incumbents are 
trying to expand their skills and capabilities (Merler, 2017). Banks may decide to purchase 
financial products or services directly from FinTech players when it is too costly for them to 
internalize their production. Thanks to the collaboration with FinTech companies, banks can 
ensure cheaper and easier to use financial solutions, faster and automated processes, and they 
can outsource some activities to partners to be more efficient. All these trends show that 
efficiency needs to be a central objective of banks to operate successfully.  
 
In the literature, we can find several definitions of efficiency: technical efficiency, allocative 
efficiency, economic efficiency, cost efficiency, and scale efficiency. 
For the purpose of our work, we follow the definition provided by the ECB (2010). The ECB 
described efficiency as the ability of a bank to generate revenue from a given amount of assets 
and to make profit from a given source of income. Efficiency can be measured using the cost-
to-income ratio (henceforth “CIR”) which expresses the capability of the institution to generate 
gross profits from a given revenue stream (Arnaboldi and Rossignoli, 2015). CIR is traditionally 
computed as non-interest expenses, excluding bad debt and tax expense, divided by the sum of 
net interest income and non-interest income (Hess and Francis, 2004). It measures the output 
of a bank in relation to its utilized input, and it shows the amount of expenses that are needed 
in a given time period to generate a specific amount of revenues (Burger and Moormann, 2008). 
CIR is recognized as the most popular ratio to measure cost efficiency since it can be easily 
computed, it allows a fast and easily feasible comparison of banks, it can be easily computed, 
and the results seem to be intuitive.  
In the literature about CIR, it is commonly recognized that a high CIR is equivalent to low 
productivity and low efficiency and vice-versa (Hussain, 2014). Hess and Francis (2004) 
showed that there is an inverse relationship between the CIR and the bank profitability. Ghosh 
et al. (2003) found out that a negative relation between efficiency and the CIR exists, and this 
means that more efficient banks (with lower CIRs) generate higher profits. Therefore, it seems 
to exist a negative correlation between CIR and efficiency and a positive relationship between 
efficiency and profitability.  
Although banks focus on the reduction of CIR as proxy for cost efficiency, CIR has some 
limitations in assessing efficiency (Beccalli et al., 2006). Osborne (1995) found no clear 
correlation between the CIR and the ROE of a sample of banks. Bekier and Nickless (1998) 
found important differences regarding cost efficiencies among countries which adopt different 
payment systems. Countries where cheques are widely used for non-cash payments (USA, 
56 
 
Canada, Australia, and the UK) tend to have more costly banking systems than European 
countries which rely more on electronic transaction methods.  
Moreover, using financial ratios to measure efficiency has some disadvantages with respect to 
parametric and non-parametric approaches (Stochastic Frontier Approach and Data 
Envelopment Analysis) because financial ratios tend to ignore the input price and the output 
mix (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). A closer analysis of CIR calculation shows that price 
components (interest rates, commission fees and factor costs) influence the determination of 
earnings and expenses and so they alter the ability of CIR to measure efficiency (Burger and 
Moormann, 2008). Earnings are based on sales quantities and assessed on prices, while 
administrative costs are determined looking at the cost of production factors. The consideration 
of prices on the earning side can be problematic for the measurement of efficiency which detects 
the level of a bank’s production and settlement capability. Therefore, prices elements should 
not be included in the measurement of productivity.  
Lastly, banks that operate in different countries may be characterised by different interest rates 
and commission fees. Since these elements are part of the CIR, banks situated in countries with 
higher interest margins ceteris paribus appear to be more efficient and productive than others. 
Considering the limitations of the CIR, academics have developed parametric and non-
parametric methods which estimates the operating efficiency (Beccalli et al., 2006). Operating 
efficiency occurs when a company is cost minimising (using less inputs for the same level of 
outputs) or profit maximising (producing more outputs for the same amount of inputs). This 
concept of efficiency is proxied by a frontier index knows as X-efficiency (defined as the ratio 
of the minimum costs that have been expended to produce a given output bundle to the actual 
expenses) which is used to measure bank performance and is considered a better indicator 
compared to traditional accounting ratios (Berger and Humphrey, 1992).  
Summing up, efficiency has become one of the main objectives of banks and bankers, especially 
after the 2008 financial crisis and the consequent strengthening of bank capital requirements. 
A bank, as any other organization, should be able to generate profits with an efficient use of its 
inputs and resources. The focus on efficiency is also increased due to the greater competition 
from nonbank players such as FinTech companies that operate in the banking sector. The 
competition from FinTech players induces banks to adopt new technologies, to develop new 
automated processes and new financial services. 
We presented a simple but comprehensive definition of efficiency provided by ECB: efficiency 
is the bank’s ability to generate revenue from a given amount of assets and to make profit from 
a given source of income. Regarding efficiency measurement, we described different 
approaches from the traditional cost to income ratio to the more precise DEA and SFA methods. 
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Since in our work we will analyse the correlation between FinTech innovations and banks’ 
efficiency focusing on the cost dimension of FinTech instruments adopted by banks, we believe 
it is opportune to apply the cost-to-income approach. 
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3. Impact of FinTechs acquisitions on banks’ performance 
 
In the previous chapters we analysed the FinTech phenomenon and the emergence of FinTech 
start-ups (henceforth “FinTechs”) which provide innovative financial solutions and services.  
FinTech is a complex phenomenon threatening the banking industry and the traditional financial 
institutions. It includes both technological innovations (distributed ledger technology, artificial 
intelligence, robo-advisory, and Application Programming Interfaces or APIs), and FinTechs 
which provide new financial services based on FinTech innovations. Over the past 5 to 10 years 
customers significantly changed their view of financial services companies and their needs 
(KMPG, 2017). Customers expect more innovative, faster, and efficient financial services. 
However, traditional banks have failed to provide these services because of stringent regulatory 
requirements and inflexible, slow-to-adapt legacy core banking systems (Schwab and Guibaud, 
2016). 
In the current era of digitalization and automation, financial institutions should be able to 
quickly respond to their customers’ needs with customized and easier to use financial products. 
Therefore, financial institutions and banks feel the pressure to both modernize their 
infrastructure and respond to changing customers’ demands and expectations. The banking 
industry is facing a fierce competition from FinTechs from a variety of fronts. FinTechs are 
able to better satisfy customers’ needs adopting a variety of technologies to increase the 
accessibility and speed of their services (Capgemini,2018). The elaboration of advanced data 
analytics and the greater attention on customer data allow FinTechs to offer tailored services 
and products adopting a more customer-focused approach in contrast with traditional banks. 
FinTech innovations guarantee their clients more transparency and dependability through 
digital, automated and more efficient processes. Moreover, the emergence of FinTechs led to 
the introduction of new business models such as P2P lending which may have a significant 
impact on lending and retailing sectors. With respect to traditional banks FinTech have no 
legacy infrastructure and so, they can keep costs down and offer lower-priced solutions (such 
as robo-advisors). Finally, through innovation and low-cost financial solutions, FinTechs can 
reach and satisfy customers who are generally unserved or underserved by the traditional 
financial industry. All these elements represent FinTechs’ strengths and sources of competitive 
advantage with respect to banks and other financial institutions which should invest more time 
and attention on evolving customers’ needs and technological advances.  
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3.1 Collaboration between banks and FinTechs 
Collaborations and relationships between FinTechs and incumbents can be win-win situations 
for both entities considering the complementarity of their features and competitive advantages 
(Capgemini, 2018). FinTechs offer agility, focus on customer experience, and lack of legacy 
systems while banks bring infrastructure, brand name and customer trust, and their ability to 
deal with regulation. Although FinTech are closer to customers’ needs introducing innovative 
products, they face challenges in scaling-up and establishing financially viable business models. 
Despite the growth and the great number of FinTechs, only few FinTech companies and 
products have reached a significant scale. FinTechs’ weaknesses come from the lack of 
customer trust and brand name since it takes time for FinTechs to attract customers which 
reposed trust in traditional financial institutions. Unlike banks and other financial institutions, 
FinTechs do not have well-established distribution infrastructures, and this may prevent them 
from reaching a broad customer base. Even though FinTechs have a leaner and low-cost 
structure thanks to the absence of legacy systems, regulatory and supervisory bodies across the 
worlds are introducing protocols and regulations for Fintechs. This decision comes from the 
continuous expansion of FinTechs in the financial industry, even if many of them do not have 
the expertise in handling complex regulation and mandates. FinTechs need also to face issues 
about financing and capital. Indeed, they heavily rely on venture capital funding based on the 
uniqueness of their businesses. If FinTechs’ new ideas do not generate interest, this can 
compromise the financing of firm’s operations and activities. Finally, for FinTechs it is difficult 
to reach economies of scale without collaborating with incumbents. Although FinTechs offer 
low-cost financial solutions, they can profit only with economies of scale which may allow 
them to attract and gain new customers. As mentioned above, collaboration can be a profitable 
solution for both FinTechs and traditional financial institutions since FinTechs challenges are 
often natural strengths of incumbents and vice versa.  
Although FinTechs are real competitors for different players of the financial industry (banks, 
insurances, financial institutions), they especially threat traditional banks. Indeed, FinTechs 
have partly taken over functions and activities previously reserved for incumbents, e.g., in 
payments, lending and investing (Eickhoff et al.,2017). They began to provide financial 
services which are similar to those provided by traditional banks but are not subject to the same 
degree of regulatory pressure in terms of licences, capital and rules. For this reason, we will 
focus our analysis on the relationship between banks and FinTechs.  
The emergence of new competitors as FinTechs altered the composition of the banking industry, 
and it induced banks to elaborate FinTech strategies to maintain their role in the financial sector. 
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In addition, the development of new technologies and the shifts in customers’ needs increased 
the interest of banks in FinTech innovations and companies.  
Banks can adopt different strategies to curb the potential threat from FinTechs (Ernst & Young, 
2017). Banks may decide to invest their own capital in FinTechs as in-house venture capital, 
independent venture capital funds or investments on their own balance sheet. Investments in 
FinTechs allow banks to gain early access to innovative solutions, resolve the lack of in-house 
talent and innovative culture, and reduce the time-to-market. Banks can also enter in different 
types of arrangements with FinTechs: utilizing products or platforms developed by FinTechs 
(for example in the case of robo-advice), creating partnerships or collaboration as a whole 
network, establishing joint ventures or co-creating new services (a bank partner with a FinTech 
to launch a new digital marketplace). Creating partnerships or collaborations with FinTechs is 
one of the most common strategy in the banking industry given its innumerable advantages in 
terms of speed, cost and acquisition of new customers (KPMG,2017). Through the creation of 
alliances, FinTechs’ products and services can reach the large customer base of banks and at 
the same time, banks can help FinTechs address regulatory requirements and gain access to new 
customer segments (Klus et al., 2018).  
Instead of investing in FinTechs, banks could accelerate their in-house development of FinTech 
products and services. When a bank decides to build FinTech innovations, they can define the 
scope of their initiatives and design tailor-made products or services (KPMG,2017). However, 
few financial institutions adopt this strategy because they do not have time, resources, 
capabilities and agility to develop FinTech innovations efficiently and effectively. Indeed, to 
create in-house innovations, internal capabilities, technical competencies and cultural 
disposition to embrace change are required. For banks, the building strategy represents a 
challenge also because the strict regulation and the complexity of their businesses have 
historically slow down their innovation process (Ernst & Young, 2017).  
Another model of engagement with FinTechs is represented by mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Banks may directly acquire FinTechs increasing their digital footprint and reducing 
costs for the development of new technologies. Acquiring FinTechs may be an effective way 
to avoid the development process by directly gaining access to FinTech capabilities. Even 
though M&A transactions between banks and FinTechs are a very recent phenomenon in the 
banking industry, they can lead to important benefits for both players. Banks would have direct 
access to talent and innovative culture, reach new markets and speed up processes and products 
delivery to final customers. Since FinTechs adopt new technologies, offer alternative innovative 
financial solutions and reach underserved customers, banks would also have the possibility to 
enlarge their product and market differentiation. With respect to collaborations, M&As 
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operations are more complex because they imply a complete integration between two entities 
with different culture, capabilities and knowledge.  
Banks could also create a relationship of white-labelling with FinTechs or other technologies 
companies. In this situation, FinTechs develop and realize the financial products or services, 
which are then brand and sell by banks. Applying this strategy, banks have access to innovative 
products without bearing the cost for their realization, and they can test value and fill potential 
product/service gaps. However, banks have less control than developing the products internally, 
they need to integrate this innovative structure within their business and to share revenue 
(KPMG,2017). In some cases, FinTechs sell their products only under their partner bank’s 
brand (Bömer and Maxin, 2018). Analysing a sample of FinTech in the German industry, the 
authors found out that all FinTech that apply white-label approach cooperate with many 
different banks. Therefore, FinTechs are only technology services providers, and they distribute 
their technology to banks to increase profits and number of users. White-labelling is convenient 
for banks because they can offer innovative financial solutions to their customers without the 
need to build or develop the necessary legacy systems. With this type of collaboration, it 
emerges a new hybrid model for banks so called BankTech (Schwab and Guibaud, 2016). In 
this model banks would put at FinTech companies’ disposal their core banking infrastructure 
and sometimes their banking licence while indirectly reaching new customers which were 
unserved in the past (for example young people, the unbanked, SMEs or digital natives). 
Although FinTechs provide innovative financial solutions through a more customer-centric 
experience, some of them need banks’ support, knowledge and expertise to operate. In the 
relationship bank-FinTechs banks will not only lend FinTechs with their backbone 
infrastructure to operate, but also rely on them to serve their existing clients better. 
Finally, banks are leading or participating in a number of accelerators, incubators and training 
programmes to get access to technologies and talent without taking any significant stake in the 
FinTechs. On the other side, FinTechs gain easy access to resources, data, funding, space and 
networking opportunities to test their prototypes. This is the case of joint FinTech programs or 
lead FinTech programs.   
To conclude the analysis, the report of KPMG (2017) shows that collaboration is the preferred 
engagement strategy when banks need to interact with FinTechs to drive financial innovation.  
However, although banks still hesitate, acquisitions of FinTechs are an emerging phenomenon 
in the banking industry. CB Insights (2018) identifies and analyses 20 Fintechs acquisitions by 
banks in the period 2014-2018. Most of these acquisitions occurred after September 2017, and 
this confirms that such type of deals is very recent and that banks are changing their behaviour 
towards FinTechs. Banks involved in these acquisitions are especially European (BBVA, BNP 
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Paribas, Credit Suisse) and US (Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Capital One, Ally, 
First Republic Bank, Silicon Valley Bank, and KeyCorp) banks. In table 1 we recap the 
acquisitions of FinTechs performed during the period 2014-2018. 
 
Table 3: Acquisitions of FinTechs performed by banks between 2014 and 2018 
Bidder Target FinTech sector Date Transaction 
 
 
BBVA 
Simple Digital Banking 2014 Cross-border 
Madiva Soluciones Real Estate 2014 Domestic 
Holvi Digital Banking 2016 Cross-border 
Openpay Alternative Payments 2016 Cross-border 
 
 
Goldman Sachs 
Honest Dollar Wealth Tech 2016 Domestic 
Financeit Lending & Credit 2017 Cross-border 
Final Lending & Credit 2018 Domestic 
Clarity Money Personal Finance 2018 Domestic 
 
BNP Paribas 
Compte Nickel Digital Banking 2017 Domestic 
Gambit Financial 
Solutions 
Wealth Tech 2017 Cross-border 
 
Capital One 
Level Money Personal Finance 2015 Domestic 
Paribus Personal Finance 2016 Domestic 
 
JP Morgan 
Chase & Co. 
WePay Alternative Payments 2017 Domestic 
MCX Alternative Payments 2017 Domestic 
Ally TradeKing Capital Markets Tech 2016 Domestic 
Credit Suisse TradePlus24 Lending & Credit 2017 Domestic 
First Republic 
Bank 
Gradifi Inc. Lending & Credit 2016 Domestic 
Silicon Valley 
Bank 
Standard Treasury Capital Markets Tech 2015 Domestic 
TD Bank Layer 6 Artificial Intelligence 2018 Domestic 
Sources: CB Insights (2018); CrunchBase 
 
From this analysis, we can see that all acquisitions occurred in Europe and in the US, with the 
only exception of TD Bank which operates in Canada. Although European and American banks 
reduced their investments in fintech in 2017 with respect to 2016, they are finally picking up 
FinTech acquisitions (CB Insights, 2018).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the aim of our work is to investigate the impacts of 
FinTechs on banks’ performance. To conduct this analysis, we will consider the acquisition of 
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FinTech companies performed by a bank to analyse the strategy behind the deal and the impact 
of acquisitions on the performance of the acquiring bank. 
 
3.2 BBVA and FinTechs acquisitions  
From the analysis of FinTechs acquisitions by banks, it emerged that Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria (henceforth “BBVA) is the most active bidder within the European banking 
industry. For this reason, we decide to focus on FinTechs acquisitions performed by BBVA in 
order to understand the motives and the strategy behind the deals and to investigate the 
consequences and effects on the performance of the bank. Before analysing the acquisitions 
performed by BBVA, we will briefly illustrate its history, sources of competitive advantage and 
business strategies. 
 
3.2.1 The BBVA Group 
BBVA is a customer-centric global financial services group founded in 1857 as an issuance and 
discount bank by the Board of Commerce. During the economic development of the 1960s in 
Spain, Banco de Bilbao expanded its business, acquiring other banks and creating a financial 
group. In the meanwhile, Banco de Vizcaya continued to grow and established itself as a 
modern bank within an important financial group. After increasing their size and presence in 
the Spanish banking industry during the 1980s, Banco de Bilbao and Banco de Vizcaya agreed 
to a merger creating the new BBV. In the meanwhile, Corporación Bancaria de España, created 
as a state-owned enterprise and credit institution with the status of a bank, merged with other 
Spanish public banks under the brand of Argentaria.  
In 1999 BBV announced its merger with Argentaria, a brand born in 1988 representing a group 
of banks and official credit institutions. The deal between BBV and Argentaria allowed the two 
banks to reach a strong, large financial structure, an ample diversification of business and risks, 
and therefore, greater potential for increasing its profits. BBVA offers its customers an 
extensive distribution network, a wider range of products, new channels and a strong 
international presence. The integrations process between BBV and Argentaria received a major 
boost with the adoption of a single BBVA brand in January 2000, favouring the creation of an 
image base on its own unique identity. One of the main peculiarities of BBVA is its international 
presence. Indeed, the Group has a strong leadership position in the Spanish market, it is the 
largest financial institution in Mexico, and it has leading franchises in South America and in 
the South of the US.  
The 2008 financial crisis posed new challenges for the financial industry which faced an 
increase in regulatory pressure. Stricter regulatory requirements along with low interest rates 
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and activities slowdowns caused a negative impact on profitability of the banking industry 
around the world. In addition, the financial industry is facing the competition from new 
specialized players (FinTechs, Tech giants) which base their business models on better 
customer experience and lower operating costs. The emergence of new entrants was also 
favoured by the development of new technologies (AI, Blockchain, Big Data, Biometrics, Data 
processing, and Cloud) characterized by automated data analysis, algorithms, and process 
automation. BBVA Group was able to transform its strategy and value proposition in 
accordance with the new challenges posed by the financial industry. Considering the customer-
centric approach adopted by new players and the shift in customers’ needs, BBVA Group 
elaborated a new value proposition based on its customers’ real needs in order to strengthen the 
relationship with them. Firstly, BBVA wants to help its customers make the best financial 
decisions through a clear and transparent offering of financial products and services. Moreover, 
the offering of financial services must be easy and convenient giving customers the possibility 
of accessing the services and using their preferred channels (digital or traditional channels). 
Finally, the Group wants to provide relevant help and advice so that customers can make their 
best financial decisions. With this aim, BBVA offers its clients daily financial support, 
innovative and personalized products and services.  
Customer experience is the first purpose and strategic priority for the Group even if digitization 
and innovations are essential to guarantee a better customer experience and to become the 
leaders in customer satisfaction. Digitization has become the driver of BBVA’s transformation 
since it is an essential element for boosting digital channels and developing innovative products. 
To accomplish its transformation and maintain the competitive advantage, the Group is actively 
participating in the disruption of the financial industry caused by the market entry of FinTechs 
and other Tech giants. For this purpose, BBVA elaborated the New Digital Business (NDB) 
unit and strengthened its position in the FinTech ecosystem investing in FinTech innovations 
and start-ups. Besides a better customer experience and a greater digitization, the Group aims 
at reaching an optimal capital allocation to improve business profitability and sustainability, 
and efficiency leadership considering the low-profitability environment for the financial 
industry.  
 
3.2.2 BBVA’s strategies in the FinTech sector 
Since our work focuses on FinTechs acquisitions performed by banks, we will concentrate on 
BBVA’s digitization strategies and results. 
As mentioned above, BBVA created the NDB unit in 2015 to keep abreast of the digital 
disruption of the financial industry caused by the FinTech phenomenon. The unit operates as 
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an independent entity between the bank and the acquired companies, and it handle all 
transactions and deals elaborated by BBVA towards the FinTech ecosystem.  
The mission of the new unit consists of four pillars: Build, Acquire, Invest, and Partner. The 
aim of “build” is to recruit experienced entrepreneurs and develop, finance and incubate their 
FinTech ventures at one of the venture creation centres (Madrid, San Francisco, London) of the 
Group. With this purpose, BBVA created internal ventures with Denizen, CoVault, Muno, and 
Azlo. 
Incubated out of BBVA’s NDB unit in San Francisco, Denzen allows customers to receive 
money in one country and pay it out in another immediately, avoiding international transfer 
fees and eliminating currency exchange fees. In this way, Denzen significantly reduces time 
and costs of international banking. CoVault specialises in delivering super secure digital 
identity and security solutions for both consumers and businesses. Supported by BBVA through 
NDB unit, CoVault launches a new mobile app aimed at simplifying the process of storing, 
sharing, and verifying online identities. This solution uses key encryption linked to the 
biometric signature on the user’s device, allowing the user to digitally protect his sensitive 
information from being accessed without his authorization. Muno is a start-up which launched 
a new health insurance for freelancers to suit their needs and solve their challenging issues. 
Finally, Azlo is the first digital banking platforms offering free business accounts with 
unlimited payments to anyone in the US or Mexico, and including bill pay, mobile check 
deposit and basic digital invoicing in the baseline product. The aim of Azlo is to increase the 
availability of both domestic and cross-border banking services for both customers and 
businesses. Incubating and financing these FinTech ventures allow BBVA to gain competitive 
advantage in digital and open banking guaranteeing their customers process transparency, faster 
and cheaper financial solutions, and protection of personal data and information.  
Another mission of the new NDB unit is to invest in FinTech ventures and companies like 
Propel Venture Partners and Atom bank. Propel Venture Partners is an independent venture 
capital firm which provides opportunities at the intersection of technology and finance. As 
reported on the website of BBVA, the Group invested in two vehicles focused on financial 
technology, which Propel manages as a third party. 
Atom is the UK’s first bank exclusively built for smartphones and tablets without traditional 
physical branches. Through the mobile app, customers can carry out all transactions and create 
their own personalised brand. In March 2018 BBVA announced an additional investment in the 
UK digital bank to increase its stake. The Group invested a further £85.4m (€96m approx) 
increasing its ownership in the challenger bank to around 39%. This move shows BBVA’s 
confidence in the business strategy of Atom and brings the total invested so far, including this 
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latest tranche, to £167m (€189m). The new capital invested by BBVA in Atom allows the 
digital bank to continue its impressive growth in the UK and offer new products and services.  
After Atom Bank, BBVA announced an investment in solarisBank, a German banking platform, 
following its participation in a Series B funding round. The deal is perfectly in line with the 
digital transformation process of the Group, and it allows BBVA to reinforce its presence in the 
digital banking sector. solarisBank, the first banking platform with a full banking license, 
enables companies to offer their own financial products from solarisBank and also those of 
third-party providers.  
The NDB unit also aims at creating partnerships with FinTechs and other technological 
innovators.  BBVA is working with R3, the consortium for financial innovation, in the 
development of a blockchain-based identity management system for the digitization of the 
documentation process of trade finance.  
In June 2017 BBVA signed an agreement with Ant Financial Services to allow Chinese tourists 
to pay in Spanish stores using Alipay which is the largest online and mobile payment and 
marketing platform. The Group will integrate Alipay into the bank’s Smartpay services which 
turn smartphones into a payment method. 
BBVA also created collaborations with Prosper, specialized in consumer lending, and Ripple, 
a blockchain network that allows the first real-life implementation of an international money 
transfer using its new DLT.  
Finally, a key point in BBVA’s FinTech strategy is represented by the acquisition of innovative 
FinTech companies and technological disrupters. As mentioned above, BBVA is the most 
active European bank in the acquisition of FinTechs. The first FinTech company acquired by 
the Group was Simple in February 2014, followed by Madiva in December 2014, Holvi and 
Openpay respectively in March and December 2016. Acquisitions of FinTechs play a key role 
in the digitalization and transformation strategy elaborated by the Group. 
The first BBVA’s acquisition involved Simple, a US-based online banking start-up. Founded 
in 2009 in Portland, Simple organized its commercial launch only in 2012. The company offers 
customers traditional banking services but in an innovative and smarter way. Customers receive 
a white card (Simple Visa® card) that can be used as a debit card, and they can take advantage 
of features like direct deposit and money transfers. At the moment of the deal, Simple served 
about 100,000 customers across the US, a fivefold increase since the end of 2012.  
The deal was concluded by the US-based BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. (a subsidiary of 
BBVA) for a value of $117m. After the acquisition, Simple continued to operate separately 
under the same brand and with the same approach to customer experience. With the help of 
BBVA, Simple developed new products and services, and it was able to expand beyond the US 
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and enter new markets, considering the international presence of BBVA. Moreover, by joining 
with the Spanish bank, it could jointly gain complete end-to-end ownership of the customer 
experience, from the offer to the realization and the sell of financial solutions. In this way, both 
companies increased their degree of flexibility and control on new innovations. The acquisition 
of Simple helped BBVA to operate a geographical expansion in the US, where it operates even 
now through Compass subsidiary. Indeed, at the time of the acquisition the Spanish group had 
a relatively small presence and influence in the USA. Moreover, for BBVA purchasing Simple 
gave it access to about 100,000 new customers in the US and to new technologies that will help 
BBVA attract more. The deal between BBVA and Simple was a sort of revolution within the 
banking industry since banks and FinTechs operate with different business models, customer 
approaches and strategies. Indeed, Simple, as FinTech company, was characterized by a very 
low-cost business model, no physical branches and customer-centric approach which enabled 
BBVA to improve its customers’ experience and satisfaction.  
In December 2014 BBVA acquired Madiva Soluciones, a Spanish start-up providing services 
based on big data and cloud computing. Its services simplify existing transactions and create 
new business opportunities by processing unstructured data and high volumes of information 
available on Internet. BBVA recognized a great potential in the big data sector, and the purchase 
of Madiva allowed the Group to strengthen its capabilities in this sector and to improve the 
offering for its clients. After the acquisition, Madiva continued to operate as an independent 
company, serving not only its original customer but also BBVA’s clients. For this reason, the 
acquisition was a successful deal for Madiva because it allowed the small Spanish start-up to 
enlarge its customer base and to collaborate with an international banking group which is still 
now betting on the development of FinTechs. The acquisition turned out to be very successful 
for both BBVA and the Spanish start-up itself. Indeed, in August 2018 the Group and Madiva 
launched BBVA Valora, which became BBVA’s flagship product with 150,000 queries a month 
from users providing advice and guidance on home purchase. Madiva played a key role in the 
elaboration of BBVA Valora since it developed an algorithm that helped identify customers 
with high purchasing power and limited relationship with BBVA. Madiva’s knowledge about 
bid data and cloud computing was essential to provide customers a personalised and efficient 
tool. 
In line with the transformation strategy, BBVA continued the process of acquisitions in the 
FinTech sector, purchasing Holvi and Openpay in 2016. In March 2016 BBVA announced the 
strategic acquisition of the Finnish Holvi. Founded in 2011, Holvi provides entrepreneurs, small 
and medium-sized businesses with a range of financial services as well as traditional banking 
through its online platform. The Finnish company offers tools to both collect money and to 
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manage personal finances. Moreover, the online platform includes an online sales platform, an 
invoicing facility and a cashflow tracker. Holvi was created with the view to meeting needs and 
requirements of small entrepreneurs and businesses. Through the latest innovations in FinTech, 
it was able to realize an all-in-one banking service that streamlines the most complicated and 
time-consuming financial processes. Finally, Holvi is the world’s first financial service 
operating with its own Payment Institution License, regulated by the Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Finland (FIN-FSA). After the deal Holvi continued to operate as a stand-alone 
entity, but with an important flow of knowledge, ideas and support with BBVA. Both 
companies are united by the same vision about the benefit of technology and innovation for the 
customer. From BBVA’s perspective, the acquisition enabled it to further develop a new digital 
approach to small business banking, while for Holvi the purchase gave it the necessary room to 
grow, and the scale and expertise to consolidate that growth.  
At present (2019) BBVA’s last acquisition in the FinTech ecosystem is Openpay, occurred in 
December 2016.Openpay is a Mexican payment service provider (PSP) which facilitates e-
commerce for large businesses and SMEs, a critical customer segment for traditional banks. It 
was founded in 2013 with the aim of building a “one-stop shop” for e-commerce, providing a 
real time online platform which allows users to make card, cash and loyalty-points payments 
and interbank transfers. Thanks to Openpay, a business can start processing different types of 
payments and bank transfers through a single integration, reducing its operating costs. Openpay 
operates in Mexico through Paynet, its own global network of more than 15,000 (in 2018) 
associated points-of-sale. Through Paynet, Openpay enables cash payments for online 
purchases, and it manages more than one million transactions a month. The online platform also 
uses advanced tools to prevent fraud and protect customers’ accounts. Indeed, it analysed each 
transaction in real time with its anti-fraud system to prevent fraudulent charges, and it has the 
PCI-DDS certification (an international security standard in the handling of payment data) for 
handling and storing card private information. The acquisition did not imply any operating 
changes or changes in fees for existing Openpay customers. They continued operating as 
usually but enjoying an additional level of reassurance since they are now backed by a more 
stable and stronger company. The transaction with Openpay was conducted by BBVA 
Bancomer, the business unit of BBVA operating in Mexico. Through the acquisition BBVA 
Bancomer increased its range of online payments solutions, while Openpay strengthened its 
commercial role by collaborating with Mexico’s largest bank. The synergies between the bank 
and the start-up improved the commercial capacities of both companies, complemented their 
catalogue of products for retail clients and allowed them to strengthen their payment solutions. 
Since Openpay is even now one of the principal innovators in Latin America in payments, its 
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acquisition also represented an important step forward for Mexican banking. In this way, it 
opened to the new financial players that are able to satisfy users’ needs in a more agile fashion. 
Moreover, e-commerce is on the rise around the world- and in Mexico in particular- driven by 
tremendous growth in digital payments. The acquisition of Openpay perfectly falls in BBVA’s 
strategy of digitalization, and it reinforces one of the bank’s strategic priorities: offering a better 
customer experience, in line with new customers’ needs. This transaction enabled the Group to 
remain at the cutting edge of payments systems, bringing numerous benefits also for customers. 
Along with the acquisitions performed in the previous years, the purchase of Openpay showed 
BBVA’s commitment to digital transformation in order to revolutionize the banking industry 
in accordance with FinTech innovations.  
Analysing all the acquisitions performed by BBVA until now, it emerges the attention of the 
Spanish Group towards technological innovations brought by FinTech in the financial industry. 
BBVA has always declared that digital transformation is one of the priorities of its strategy, and 
it seeks to achieve this goal investing, incubating and acquiring FinTech ventures and 
companies. In the context of FinTechs acquisitions, BBVA can be considered as an early 
adopter of these innovations, following the “diffusion of innovation” theory elaborated by 
Rogers. Indeed, considering the sample of FinTechs transactions mentioned in Table 1, BBVA 
performed the first acquisition of a FinTech company in the history of the banking industry, 
and it is also the most active European banks in the purchase of new players. 
All the acquisitions of FinTechs performed by the Group are united by its commitment to digital 
transformation to improve customer experience and offer better financial solutions. 
Technological innovation has become an essential source of value and competitive advantage 
for companies. Indeed, many authors (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; King et al., 2008; Makri et al., 
2012) argued that companies turn to acquisitions as an alternative strategy for obtaining the 
knowledge necessary to create innovations. This is the strategy adopted by BBVA in the 
acquisitions of FinTechs. Given technological advances and shifts in customers’ needs, BBVA 
understood the key role of digital innovation in the banking industry. Indeed, the acquisitions 
of FinTechs allowed BBVA to obtain and integrate knowledge and capabilities from acquiring 
firms to better meet customers’ requirements and to face the fierce competition from new 
technological players. Through these transactions, BBVA also gained access to growing sectors 
of FinTech such as digital banking, online payments solutions, big data and cloud computing. 
BBVA can now offer its clients cheaper (FinTechs generally apply lower charges, fees and 
interest rates) and faster traditional banking services, guaranteeing them more transparency of 
processes and more security of personal information.  
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 Except for Madiva Soluciones, the other three acquisitions performed by BBVA are cross-
border transactions toward the US, Finland and Mexico. 
In accordance with academic literature, there are several reasons that can induce companies to 
perform cross-border acquisitions rather than domestic transactions (Datta, 2018). Analysing 
the cross-border acquisitions performed by BBVA, we refer only to some motives such as 
growth, synergies, increase in market power and market entry, and access to inputs and 
technology. Expansion and growth through M&As are less time consuming and more cost 
effective than internally developing the necessary production capability and capacity. Indeed, 
the realization of new facilities and infrastructures requires investments and so, it may be more 
profitable to acquire existing facilities of another company. This reason is in line with the 
strategy declared by BBVA even if the Spanish Group is also committed to incubating and 
financing FinTech ventures. Another motive is linked to the realization of potential synergies 
between the bidder and the target company. Combining their efforts and resources, firms can 
produce better results with lower operating costs. In the case of BBVA the acquisitions of 
FinTechs may allow the Spanish bank to realize operating synergies in terms of higher growth 
in new (the US, Mexico, Finland) or existing markets (Spain). 
Cross-border transactions can also allow acquired company to gain access to new markets. In 
this case, a foreign company prefers to acquire a local firm which knows the market and has an 
established customer base. In the case of BBVA, cross-border acquisitions allow it to 
geographically expand and strengthen its presence in markets such as the US and Mexico where 
it had a relatively small impact. At the time of Simple acquisition, the FinTech financing 
activity in the US far exceeded that of every other country, as reported by Accenture. The US 
market was characterized by the highest rate of Fintech investments (about $10,000m) and deals 
(more than 500). The trends of the US market and its attention on FinTech innovations attracted 
BBVA which strengthened and differentiated its original strategy by directly acquiring FinTech 
companies. Focusing on the acquisition of Openpay, BBVA performed the deal in a moment of 
tremendous growth for the Mexican FinTech sector. BBVA was and is still now one of the 
largest banks that dominate Mexico. The strong position of the Group in Mexico gave it the 
opportunity to acquire a Mexican start-up to consolidate its presence not only within the 
traditional banking system but also in the innovative FinTech ecosystem. Moreover, cross-
border transactions also enabled BBVA to enlarge its customer base, gaining access to acquired 
firms’ customers. 
Finally, companies generally perform cross-border operations to gain access to technology and 
latest innovations. This perfectly reflects the commitment of BBVA to digital transformation 
and innovation of its business model. Indeed, BBVA acquired inputs and technologies of 
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FinTechs in both domestic and cross-border transactions. As mentioned above, BBVA gained 
access to innovations as digital banking, online payments solutions, big data and data analytics 
which are the most disruptive FinTech innovation for the retail banking sector.  
Summing up, the acquisitions of FinTechs performed so far are based on three objectives of 
BBVA’s strategy: accelerate the digital transformation process of the Group, integrate 
knowledge and capabilities about latest technological innovations, and gain access to new 
customers. 
 
3.3 Effects of acquisitions on companies’ performance: Literature Review 
In the previous paragraph, we analysed investments, partnerships, and acquisitions of FinTechs 
performed by BBVA to reach a new objective: accelerate its digital transformation. We 
described the different initiatives of the Spanish banking group in the FinTech ecosystem. We 
mainly concentrated on FinTech acquisitions to understand the strategic motives of BBVA 
behind such operations. Now we will try to investigate the effects of such acquisitions on 
BBVA’s performance. However, before focusing on BBVA’s acquisitions, we briefly describe 
the main findings in academic literature about the performance of companies after M&A 
operations.  
Many studies in the academic literature compared the accounting statements of companies 
before and after acquisitions to investigate whether and how they affect the firms’ financial 
performance. There are two distinct methodologies that can be applied to study the financial 
effects of takeover (Rahman and Limmack, 2004; Guest et al., 2012). On one side, profitability 
studies compare the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer with the pre-acquisition 
performance of the acquiring and acquired firm. On the other side, share return event studies 
examine the share price impact of the transaction on the acquired and acquiring firms. Since in 
our work we will follow the approach of profitability studies, we will describe the main findings 
of profitability studies in the academic literature. 
Considering academic studies about M&A operations in the US, they show inconsistent result. 
Indeed, some authors found no or negative impacts on companies’ post-acquisition 
performance, while others identified a positive effect of M&A operations on firms’ 
performance and profitability. The inconsistency of profitability studies may be due to different 
methodologies employed and different sample selection. 
Mueller (1980) reviewed a sample of studies across seven nations (Belgium, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US) about the effects of M&A operations on corporate 
performance. The author noticed no consistent pattern of either improved or deteriorated 
profitability after acquisitions. 
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Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) compared pre-merger and post-merger profitability of 2,732 
lines of business by US manufacturing companies during the period 1957-1977. Acquired 
companies were found to be extraordinary profitable before the acquisition, especially the 
smallest firms. After the merger, the profitability of acquired companies declined and so, the 
authors concluded that mergers have substantial negative impact on the post-acquisition 
profitability. Clark and Ofek (1994), Philippatos and Baird (1996) and Denis et al. (1997) also 
found that acquisitions do not lead to an improvement in firms’ performance. Ghosh (2001) 
argued that operating performance does not improve after an acquisition. The author 
investigated the performance of 315 US mergers occurred between 1981 and 1995, using 
control firms as benchmark. Considering firms matched on performance and size as benchmark, 
the author found no evidence that operating performance improves following acquisitions. In 
addition, the results of this study indicated that cash flows (used by many authors to measure 
financial performance) increase significantly only in case of cash acquisitions, while they 
decline for stock acquisitions. 
Healy et al. (1992) examined the post-acquisition operating performance of merged firms using 
a sample of the 50 largest mergers in the US between 1979 and 1983. Unlike Ravenscarft and 
Scherer (1989), measuring companies’ performance through operating cash flow returns, the 
authors found that combined firms have significant improvements in cash flow. These increase 
in cash flow result from improvements in asset productivity relative to firms’ industries. 
However, this study has been criticized for using industry median firms as benchmark.  
Switzer (1996) continued the Healy et al. (1992) study to analyse performance changes of a 
larger sample of 324 takeovers in the US during the period 1967-1987. The results indicated 
that the performance of the merged companies typically improved after the transaction 
considering a substantially larger sample and time period with respect to Healy et al. (1992).  
Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) examined the financial performance of target and acquiring 
firms using a sample of US companies during the period 1975-1990. The study followed the 
methodology of Healy et al. (1992), adopting industry-adjusted cash flow returns on market 
value of assets as performance criteria. Comparing the pre-merger and a five-year post-merger 
period, the authors observed a significant improvement in post-acquisition performance. In 
addition, the results indicated that post-merger performance is negatively associated with 
relative target size and positively correlated with long-term incentive compensation plans.  
Looking at the UK, Dickerson et al. (1997) investigated the impact of acquisitions on company 
performance using a sample of 613 mergers between 1948-1977. The results indicated that 
acquisitions have a detrimental impact of company performance comparing the ROA of 
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acquiring and non-acquiring firms. Moreover, the authors underlined that company growth 
through acquisitions yields a lower rate of return that growth through internal investment.  
Manson et al. (2000) further investigated a sample of 44 acquisitions in the UK between 1985 
and 1985 following the methodology adopted by Healy et al. (1992). The authors found out 
evidence of both operating and non-operating gains from takeovers in UK. However, these 
results are sensitive to how operating performance and associated gains are measured.  
Powell and Stark (2005) analysed a sample of takeovers completed in the UK over the period 
1985 to 1993 using several benchmarks and operating performance measures. The authors 
found that acquisition result in modest improvements in operating performance, even if these 
results strongly depend on the methodology adopted for the analysis. Indeed, using a procedure 
in which benchmark firms are selected on the basis of several pre-takeover characteristics, the 
authors found a slight increase in post-acquisition performance for acquiring firm. Using the 
methodology developed by Healy et al. (1992), in which post-takeover performance is 
regressed on a combined target and acquirer pre-acquisition performance, the results indicated 
larger improvements in post-acquisition operating performance.  
Cosh et al. (2006) analysed the performance of 363 takeovers in the UK completed in the period 
1985-1996. Measuring the takeover performance as changes in companies’ operating 
performance, the results indicated that takeovers have a positive but not always significant 
impact on profitability, and negative impact on short and long run returns.  
From the studies in the UK analysed before, it emerged that most of them showed a positive 
correlation between M&A operations and companies’ post-merger performance. 
We can also find inconsistent results in studies that consider other countries in Europe and in 
the rest of the world.   
In a review paper, Bruner (2002) analysed a sample of 15 studies from 1971 to 2001 analysing 
the post-acquisition financial performance of firms. The author reported that four studies 
evidenced a negative performance after the acquisition, three studies indicated a positive impact 
of the acquisition on the performance, and eight studies showed non-significant changes 
between the pre-merger and the post-merger firms’ performance.  
The methodology of cash flow developed by Healy et al. (1992) was also adopted by Sharma 
and Hao (2002). The study investigated the improvement in post-acquisition operating 
efficiency of a sample of manufacturing firms during 1986-1991 in Australia. Unlike Healy et 
al. (1992), the authors used matched sample based on assets size and industry to control for 
industry and economic factors. However, the results showed that corporate acquisitions do not 
lead to significant improvements in post-acquisition operating performance.  
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Gugler et al. (2003) analysed the effects of mergers around the world (the US, the UK, 
Continental Europe, Australia, Canada, and New Zeland) by using a large panel of data over 
the past 15 years. The authors examined the effects of the mergers by comparing profitability 
and sales of the merging firms with control groups of non-merging firms. They observed that 
takeovers produced no significant decline in companies’ performance.  
Rahman and Limmack (2004) examined the financial performance of a sample of Malaysian 
companies involved in acquisitions in the period 1988-1992. The aim of the study was to 
investigate whether takeovers in Malaysia lead to an improvement in corporate operating 
performance analysing companies’ operating cash flow performance. The results suggested that 
acquisition performed by Malaysian companies led to improvements in the long run operating 
cash flow performance. Such improvements came from both increases in return on sales and in 
asset turnover.  
Ooghe et al. (2006) analysed the impact of acquisitions on a sample of 143 privately held 
companies in Belgium between 1992 and 1994. Specifically, this study examined the financial 
performance of the acquiring firm after the acquisition, using statistical analysis of industry-
adjusted variables. The results indicated that after the transaction the profitability, the solvency 
and the liquidity of most of the combined companies decline.  
Mantravadi and Reddi (2008) examined the post-merger performance of acquiring firms from 
different industries in India. The authors adopted a sample of mergers in India between 1991 
and 2003, and they compared some pre-merger and post-merger financial ratios to investigate 
the impacts of M&A operations on the performance of acquiring firms. The authors found that 
mergers have a slightly positive impact on firms’ profitability in the banking and financial 
industry, while other sectors showed a marginal negative impact on operating performance. 
Kumar (2009) examined the post-merger operating performance of acquiring companies 
involved in M&A operations between 1999 and 2002 in India. The author compared the pre-
merger and post-merger performance of companies using accounting data to investigate merger 
related gains to the acquiring firms. He found that post-merger profitability, asset turnover and 
solvency of the acquiring firms, on average, show no improvement when compared with pre-
merger values. Therefore, he concluded that mergers usually do not improve the acquirer’s 
financial performance. 
Finally, Rani et al. (2013) investigated the impact of M&A transactions on corporate 
performance, comparing the performance of companies before and after the transaction. The 
results pertaining to operating cash flow ratios showed that there is an improvement in 
performance of the acquiring firms in the post-acquisition period. The authors conducted the 
same analysis applying the Du Pont model, and they showed that M&A operations lead to 
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improvements in the long-term operating profit margin of the acquiring firms. They concluded 
that increases in cash flows after the transaction are generated primarily due to the better 
operating margins. As for the US and the UK studies mentioned above, findings related to 
Indian M&A operations show opposite conclusion by different authors. 
From our analysis, it emerged that the academic literature is divided about the relationship 
between M&A operations and their impact on companies’ post-merger performance. The 
findings of different authors have not converged to a conclusion whether M&A operations are 
creating or destroying value for the companies involved. We found inconsistent results in 
studies conducted in the US, the UK and in other countries. Different findings may be due to 
different methodologies, different samples of M&A operations, and economic characteristics 
of different countries. The prevailing theory in the literature is that M&A operations have no or 
negative impact on the post-merger performance of both acquired and acquiring firms. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
Objective 
In our work we analyse profitability and efficiency of the acquiring firm (BBVA) before and 
after the four acquisitions (Simple, Madiva Soluciones, Holvi and Openpay) to investigate 
whether the transactions have an impact on the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer. 
To investigate the effect of acquisitions on performance, we analyse ROE, ROA and CIR of the 
acquiring company before and after the transactions. 
Research methodology 
Most of the authors in the academic literature conducted empirical analysis to investigate the 
impacts of M&A operations on companies’ performance. They developed statistical models 
which compared the pre-merger and post-merger performance of both acquiring and acquired 
firms to assess whether the transaction creates benefits for both entities. In our dissertation we 
conduct a quantitative analysis focusing only on the financial performance of the acquiring 
company (BBVA). We do not examine acquired firms’ performance since it is difficult to find 
financial statements and data of small FinTech start-ups. 
To realize our analysis, we use secondary data from the financial statements of BBVA in 
relation to the years of the transactions (2014 and 2016).  
Research Hypothesis: to test the objective mentioned above, we formulate the following general 
hypothesis: 
H0: BBVA’s acquisitions have no impact on the post-transaction performance of the acquiring 
company. 
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H1: BBVA’s acquisitions have impact on the post-transaction performance of the acquiring 
company. 
We adopt the methodology of comparing pre-merger and post-merger performance (in terms of 
profitability and efficiency) of the acquiring firm using the following financial ratios: 
-Return on equity (ROE) 
-Return on asset (ROA) 
-Cost-to-Income ratio (CIR) 
In chapter 2, we also mentioned Net Interest Margin (NIM) as a traditional indicator to measure 
the financial performance of banks. However, in the financial statements of BBVA we found 
only annual data of NIM and not quarterly data as for the other financial ratios. Using annual 
data, the two acquisitions performed in 2014 would present the same values of pre-acquisition 
and post-acquisition NIM. The same issue would also occur for the two acquisitions in 2016. 
Reducing the number of observations from 4 to 2 may cause a further decrease in the 
significance of the results. For this reason, we exclude NIM from our analysis. 
The acquisitions of our sample occurred in February 2014, December 2014, March 2016 and 
December 2016. Therefore, we decide to examine quarterly financial ratios of BBVA to 
investigate the potential effects of the operations on the post-acquisition performance of the 
Spanish Group. Many authors (Healy et al.,1992; Manson et al.,2000; Ghosh, 2001; Rahman 
and Limmack, 2004) suggest investigating the effects of M&As on corporate performance 
considering two or more years before and after the transactions. A sufficient long period is 
needed to investigate and understand the impact of an acquisition since efficiency and operating 
performance improve over a long-time horizon and not within short periods. However, we 
cannot adopt this time interval especially for the latest two acquisitions (occurred in 2016) due 
to the lack of financial data after 2017. So, we examine financial ratios’ changes in the short-
term, i.e. one year before and one year after the acquisitions.  
Since the acquisitions of Simple and Madiva Soluciones occurred in the same year (2014) but 
in different months (February and December), we consider the financial ratios of BBVA at the 
date of the acquisition. The same is valid for the two acquisitions occurred in 2016 (March and 
December). The quarter of each acquisition is denoted as t=0, while one-year before and after 
are indicated as t=-1 and t=+1 respectively.  
Tables from 2 to 5 represent the financial ratios of BBVA for each transaction. 
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Table 2: BBVA’s financial ratios for the acquisition of Simple 
Financial 
ratios 
-1 0 +1 
ROE 16.2 5.5 9 
ROA 1.25 0.51 0.73 
CIR 50.4 51.7 49.9 
 
Table 3: BBVA’s financial for the acquisition of Madiva Soluciones 
Financial 
ratios 
-1 0 +1 
ROE 5 5.6 5.3 
ROA 0.48 0.5 0.46 
CIR 52.3 51.3 52 
 
Table 4: BBVA’s financial ratios for the acquisition of Holvi 
Financial 
ratios 
-1 0 +1 
ROE 9 5.6 9.1 
ROA 0.73 0.52 0.84 
CIR 49.3 54.8 49.1 
 
Table 5: BBVA’s financial ratios for the acquisition of Openpay 
Financial 
ratios 
-1 0 +1 
ROE 5.3 6.7 6.4 
ROA 0.46 0.64 0.68 
CIR 52 51.9 49.5 
 
Paired t-test 
Pre-acquisition and post-acquisition data are tested for normality assumption to establish 
whether the paired t-test can be applied. Using Shapiro-Wilk normality test, we found that data 
of ROE, ROA and CIR both before and after the acquisition follow a normality distribution. 
Indeed, the p-value is greater than the significance level (α=5%) for ROE, ROA, and CIR pre-
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acquisition and post-acquisition values. Since the normality assumption is satisfied by all the 
three samples, we can apply a paired t-test to verify our hypothesis. 
Following the approach adopted by Ramakrishnan (2008) and Singh (2013), we compare pre-
acquisition and post-acquisition financial ratios of BBVA using paired t-test to examine if there 
is any statistically significant change in operating performance.  
We apply the paired t-test for our analysis since each financial ratio in each transaction is tested 
twice (before and after the transaction). This means that the observations are paired data. A 
paired t-test is a parametric test, which is used to compare the means of two variables from the 
same group (Ramakrishnan, 2008). It determines whether the difference between the means of 
the two variables is significantly different from zero. In our case, the two variables are the 
financial ratios of the acquiring firm before and after the transaction. The paired t-test thus 
determines whether there is a significant difference between the means of the two periods 
(before and after the acquisition) for the financial ratio. If the mean difference of the two 
variables is significantly different from zero, it means that the acquisition has an effect (positive 
or negative) on the performance of the acquiring company. If the mean difference is equal to 
zero, we can conclude that the acquisition has no impact on the corporate performance.  
For each financial ratio we conduct a paired t-test based on the following hypotheses:  
-ROE 
H0: Acquisitions have no significant impact on acquiring firm’s ROE 
H1: Acquisitions have significant impact on acquiring firm’s ROE 
-ROA 
H0: Acquisitions have no significant impact on acquiring firm’s ROA 
H1: Acquisitions have significant impact on acquiring firm’s ROA  
-CIR 
H0: Acquisitions have no significant impact on acquiring firm’s CIR 
H1: Acquisitions have significant impact on acquiring firm’s CIR 
 
We now illustrate the main steps to conduct a paired t-test. Firstly, we elaborate the hypothesis 
that we want to test: 
H0: μd =0 
H1: μd ≠0  
where μd is the mean difference. 
Secondly, we calculate the differences (henceforth “di”) between pre-acquisition and post-
acquisition data for each transaction. Now di represent our sample of data. To conduct a paired 
t-test we need to calculate the mean difference (𝐷i), the standard deviation (Sdi) of the 
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differences, and the standard error of the mean difference (SE(𝐷i)). The mean difference is 
defined as the mean of the paired differences “di”. The standard error of the mean difference is 
computed as: SE(𝐷i) =
𝑠𝑑
√𝑛
 where n is the number of differences. 
Our test statistic is:  
𝑡 =
𝐷i − μ0
SE(𝐷i)
 
where μ0 is equal to zero. Indeed, in our null hypothesis H0, we assume that there is no 
difference between pre-acquisition and post-acquisition financial ratios of the acquiring firm. 
The t-value is then compared to the p-value to decide whether to accept or reject the null 
hypothesis H0.  The values of these steps are reported in Tables from 6 to 11. 
 
Results of the paired t-test  
Using software R to conduct the paired t-test, we report the outcomes for the three financial 
ratios in Table 6.  
Table 6: Results of paired t-test for the financial ratios of the acquiring firm 
Financial 
ratios 
One-year 
before (mean) 
One-year after 
(mean) 
𝐷i SE(𝐷i) t-
value 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
ROE 8.875 7.45 1.425 1.937 0.736 0.515* 
ROA 0.73 0.6825 0.0475 0.1586 0.299 0.784* 
CIR 51 50.125 0.875 0.545 1.605 0.207* 
*Not significant at 5% significance level 
 
ROE 
The mean difference of pre-acquisition and post-acquisition ROE is equal to 1.425, the t-value 
is 0.736 with a p-value (two-tailed) at 0.515. Choosing a significance level (α) equal to 5%, the 
p-value is greater than α. Therefore, we cannot reject H0 which states that there the four 
acquisitions performed by BBVA have no significant impact on the acquiring company’s ROE. 
Failing to reject H0, we can conclude that there is no difference in pre-acquisition and post-
acquisition ROE of the acquirer. Looking at the means of ROE before and after the transaction, 
the results show a decrease in ROE from 8.8% to 7.5%. This decrease might cause a negative 
effect on the performance of the acquiring firm. However, it is not statistically significant 
reduction since the p-value (0.515) is greater than the significance level (α=5%). 
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ROA 
The table above illustrates that the mean difference of ROA is equal to 0.6825 with a t-value at 
0.299 and a p-value (two-tailed) at 0.784. Fixing the significance level α at 5%, it results a p-
value greater than α. Therefore, we cannot reject H0 which states that the four acquisitions 
performed by the Spanish Group have no significant impact on its post-acquisition ROA. Since 
our test fails to reject H0, we can conclude that a significant difference between ROA before 
and after the transaction does not exist. From the table above, it emerges a decline in ROA 
(average) from 0.73% to 0.68%. Although this reduction might negatively affect the 
performance of BBVA, it is not statistically significant given p-value > α.  
CIR 
The mean difference related to CIR is equal to 0.875, the t-value is 1.605 with a two-tailed p-
value at 0.207. Since the p-value is greater than the significance level (α=55%), we cannot reject 
H0. We can conclude that there is no a significant difference between the pre-acquisition and 
post-acquisition CIR of the acquiring company. Therefore, it emerged that the four acquisitions 
performed by BBVA have no significant impact on its post-acquisition CIR.  As for ROE and 
ROA, also post-transaction CIR reduces with respect to the value before the acquisition (from 
51% to 50.12%). With a p-value greater than α, we can state that the reduction is not statistically 
significant for the acquiring company.  
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Conclusions 
 
Considering the great development of FinTechs and the increasing interest of banks in the 
FinTech ecosystem, our work focuses on the relationship between FinTechs and traditional 
banks. Particularly, the aim of the dissertation is to assess whether acquisitions of FinTechs 
have a significant impact on the financial performance of acquiring banks.  
We referred to performance in terms of profitability and efficiency of banks, which are 
measured through return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and cost-to-income ratio 
(CIR). To investigate this issue, we considered the four acquisitions of FinTech companies 
performed by the international banking group BBVA in 2014 and 2016. We choose BBVA’s 
acquisitions since the Spanish Group is the most active European player in the FinTech 
ecosystem and acquirer of FinTechs. 
The initial objective of our work is to test whether the four acquisitions have a significant impact 
on BBVA’s post-acquisition ROA, ROE, and CIR, comparing pre-acquisition and post-
acquisition values. From the results obtained for the financial ratios, we will infer acquisitions’ 
global effect on the post-acquisition performance of the acquiring firm.   
The financial ratios related to each acquisition are measured one year before and after the 
acquisition to examine their change after the transactions. Since the values of each financial 
ratios are measured twice (before and after the acquisition), they can be considered as paired 
data. Verified the normality assumptions of financial ratios’ values, we conducted a paired t-
test to investigate whether the acquisitions influence post-acquisition financial ratios of the 
acquiring firm. Three hypotheses were formulated to assess whether BBVA’s acquisitions 
significantly affect ROA, ROE and CIR of the acquiring company. We assumed as null 
hypothesis (H0) that acquisitions have no significant effect on the post-acquisition ROE, ROA 
and CIR, while the two-tailed alternative hypothesis (H1) stated that a significant difference 
between pre-acquisition and post-acquisition financial ratios exists.   
Considering the return on equity, the results reported in Table 12 indicate a p-value greater than 
the significance level (α=5%). Therefore, we cannot reject H0 and so we can conclude that there 
is no significant difference between the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition ROE. Moreover, 
the results show a reduction in the mean ROE which declined from 8.8% to 7.5% after the 
acquisitions. Although this decline might indicate a negative impact of the acquisitions on the 
post-transaction ROE, it is not statistically significant given that p-value is greater than the 
significance level. Analysing this profitability ratio, we can conclude that the four acquisitions 
performed by BBVA do not have a significant impact on its return on equity after the 
transactions.  
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The second paired t-test is conducted to examine the impact of acquisitions on acquiring firm’s 
return on asset. The results of the paired t-test show a p-value greater than the significance level 
(α=5%). So, we cannot reject the null hypothesis which states a no significant impact of 
acquisitions on acquiring company’s ROA after the transactions. Failing to reject H0, we can 
state that acquisitions do not cause a significant change in the return on asset of the acquiring 
company. In addition, the mean of ROA reduces from 0.73% before the acquisition to 0.68% 
after the transaction, even though this decline is not statistically significant. 
Finally, we test the effect of acquisitions on the CIR of the acquiring company. As for the 
profitability ratios, the results of the paired t-test highlight a p-value greater than the significant 
level (α=5%). Since we cannot reject H0, we conclude that acquisitions do not have a significant 
impact on the cost efficiency of the acquiring firm after the transactions. Indeed, the paired t-
test do not show any significant difference between CIR before and after the acquisitions. The 
cost efficiency mean also diminishes after the transactions, from 51% to 50.12%, although this 
reduction cannot be considered statistically significant (p-value is greater than α=5%). 
Considering these results, we can state that the acquisitions performed by BBVA do not have 
any significant impact on its post-acquisition ROE, ROA, and CIR. Therefore, we can conclude 
that BBVA’s acquisitions do not significantly affect the performance of the acquiring firm.  
The results of our work are in line with some findings of profitability studies in the academic 
literature. As mentioned above in the literature review, authors are divided about the impacts 
of M&A operations on the performance of the acquiring companies. Some authors (Healy et 
al., 1992; Manson et al.,2000; Ramaswamy and Waegelein 2003; Rahman and Limmack, 2004; 
Powell and Stark, 2005) argued a positive impact of acquisitions on the performance of 
acquiring and acquired companies. However, most of the academic studies cited in our work 
(Mueller,1980; Ravenscraft and Scherer,1989; Clark and Ofek, 1994; Philippatos and Baird, 
1996; Denis et al., 1997; Dickerson et al.,1997, Ghosh,2001; Kumar,2009) found no or negative 
effect of M&A operations on the performance of the companies involved in the transactions. 
Differences may be due to different methodologies, different samples of companies and 
different accounting measures.  
Although our findings are in line with some previous academic studies, they are not out of 
limitations. A first limitation of our analysis is linked to the small sample size. Indeed, we 
measure ROE, ROA, and CIR of BBVA only in relation to four acquisitions. Small sample size 
can lead to some issues in interpreting the statistical results, especially in terms of p-value. The 
sample size is strictly related to the confidence in the estimates, uncertainty and precision. A 
small sample size generally leads to lower confidence in the results, greater uncertainty and 
lower precision and statistical power. Indeed, the results of our analysis are not statistically 
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significant for all the three financial ratios. The small sample size is due to the small number of 
FinTech acquisitions performed by traditional banks. Acquisition of FinTechs is a very recent 
phenomenon in the traditional banking sector since initially banks considered FinTechs only as 
competitors and not as sources of competitive advantages. 
In our work we focused on BBVA’s FinTechs acquisitions since it is the European banks with 
the highest number of acquisitions in the FinTech ecosystem.  
A second limitation in our analysis is the time interval adopted to measure the financial ratios 
of BBVA for the acquisitions. Most of the studies in the academic literature measure the 
financial ratios from two to five years before and after the acquisitions. Indeed, many authors 
argued that potential effects (positive or negative) on profitability and efficiency emerge only 
in the long-term. However, we adopted a short-term horizon due to the unavailability of 
financial data after 2017. The choice of a longer time interval would have excluded from our 
analysis the two acquisitions performed in March and December 2016, further reducing the 
sample size. 
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Appendix 
 
In the following tables we report the intermediary results necessary to conduct the paired t-
test. 
 
Table 7: Pre-acquisition and post-acquisition ROE 
Acquisitions One-year pre-acquisition 
ROE (%) 
One-year post-acquisition 
ROE (%) 
di 
1 16.2 9.0 7.2 
2 5.0 5.3 (0.3) 
3 9.0 9.1 (0.1) 
4 5.3 6.4 (-1.1) 
𝐷i   1.425 
 
Table 8: Results of the paired t-test for ROE 
𝐷i Sdi SE(𝐷i) t-value p-value 
1.425 3.874 1.937 0.736 0.515 
 
Table 9: Pre-acquisition and post-acquisition ROA 
Acquisitions One-year pre-acquisition 
ROA (%) 
One-year post-acquisition 
ROA (%) 
di 
1 1.25 0.75 0.5 
2 0.48 0.46 0.02 
3 0.73 0.84 -0.11 
4 0.46 0.68 -0.22 
𝐷i   0.0475 
 
Table 40: Results of the paired t-test for ROA 
𝐷i Sdi SE(𝐷i) t-value p-value 
0.0475 0.3172 0.1586 0.2995 0.7841* 
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Table 11: Pre-acquisition and post-acquisition CIR 
Acquisitions One-year pre-acquisition 
CIR (%) 
One-year post-acquisition 
CIR (%) 
di 
1 50.4 49.9 0.5 
2 52.3 52.0 0.3 
3 49.3 49.1 0.2 
4 52.0 49.5 2.5 
𝐷i   0.875 
 
Table 12: Results of the paired t-test for CIR 
𝐷i Sdi SE(𝐷i) t-value p-value 
0.875 1.090 0.545 1.605 0.207 
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